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Public Health and Racial Inequality: Why
the Opportunity Zone Program Fails
Low-Income Communities and
Costs Lives
Katie Raitz*
“The rich man’s dog gets more in the way of vaccination, medicine and medical care
than do the workers upon whom the rich man’s wealth is built.” 1
Poor health outcomes are linked to long-standing wealth disparities for people of color
in the United States. Wealth inequality has gotten worse over the past decades, despite
attempts to improve it. The 2017 Opportunity Zone (OZ) tax program is the federal
government’s most recent economic-development intervention. The OZ program provides for
low-income census tracts in each state to be designated as “Opportunity Zones” and offers tax
benefits for people who make investments in certain types of businesses and properties in OZs.
Notwithstanding the bipartisan popularity of the OZ program, this Note reveals why it is
largely symbolic and will fall short of its policy goals. Specifically, this Note argues that the
OZ program will not increase the income or wealth of OZ community members. In addition
to describing the flaws of the program, this Note explains why it should be replaced with
economic-development policy that makes direct cash payments to low-income community
members. The disparate infection and death rates of COVID-19 on communities of
color demonstrate the need for substantive, rather than symbolic, federal
economic-development interventions.

* Environmental Law Fellow and J.D. graduate, class of 2021, UC Irvine School of Law. I would like
to thank Professor Bob Solomon, Professor Shauhin Talesh, and the students in the Advanced Writing
for Law Journals class for their feedback and encouragement throughout this process. Thank you also
to the editors at the UC Irvine Law Review, and to my family, partner, and friends for their support.
1. Arthur Chatora, Remembering an African Icon: 10 Quotes from Samora Machel, THIS IS
AFR. (Oct. 19, 2015), https://thisisafrica.me/politics-and-society/10-quotes-from-pres-samoramachel/ [ https://perma.cc/VP4R-BFU8 ] (quoting Samora Machel, first president of Mozambique).
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INTRODUCTION
The United States’ infection and death rates during the COVID-19 pandemic
shocked the world—it defied logic that the global superpower would have the most
infections and the highest death toll of any country on the planet.2 But a closer look
at the data reveals a long-standing pattern of health disparity in the United
States: what you do, where you live, and the color of your skin can determine
whether you live or die.3 Low-income neighborhoods have higher COVID-19
2. See, e.g., Guo Rui, China’s Top Virus Warrior ‘Shocked’ by US Coronavirus Death Toll,
S. CHINA MORNING POST (May 26, 2020, 10:00 PM), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/
article/3086174/chinas-top-virus-warrior-shocked-us-coronavirus-death-toll [ https://perma.cc/Z2
MZ-L228 ]; Julian Borger, Helen Davidson, Leyland Cecco, Daniel Boffey, Philip Oltermann, Angela
Giuffrida, Tom Phillips & Emmanuel Akinwotu, World Looks on in Horror as Trump Flails Over
Pandemic Despite Claims US Leads Way, GUARDIAN (May 15, 2020, 4:00 AM), https://
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/may/15/donald-trump-coronavirus-response-world-leaders
[ https://perma.cc/6HM5-V3ZS ]; Brendan Miller & Adam Westbrook, Opinion, ‘That’s
Ridiculous.’: How America’s Coronavirus Response Looks Abroad., N.Y. TIMES ( July 27, 2020), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/07/27/opinion/covid-19-global-response.html [ https://perma.cc/SDG7TW3R ] (quoting a Senegalese man saying, “It’s really shocking, a superpower like the U.S. being, at this
point, like a Third World country”). For statistics on COVID-19 death and infection rates by country,
see WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://covid19.who.int/
?gclid=EAIaIQobChMI8MnGz8e26wIVzcDACh0pfQyXEAAYASAAEgIHg_D_BwE
[ https://
perma.cc/5U7K-534H ] ( last visited Oct. 19, 2021 ).
3. See William F. Marshall, III, Coronavirus Infection by Race: What’s Behind the Health
Disparities?, MAYO CLINIC (Aug. 13, 2020), https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/
coronavirus/expert-answers/coronavirus-infection-by-race/faq-20488802 [ https://perma.cc/388D8EMR ] (“[E]xperts also know that where people live and work affects their health.”); Risk for
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infection and death rates than their more affluent counterparts.4 Yet these outcomes
are predictable to low-income community members5 because the disparities in
COVID-19 death rates are merely an example of the long-term, nationwide trend
that connects individual and community wealth to well-being.6

COVID-19 Infection, Hospitalization, and Death by Race/Ethnicity, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/investigations-discovery/
hospitalization-death-by-race-ethnicity.html [ https://perma.cc/9K4N-DEX7 ] (Sept. 9, 2021) (“Race
and ethnicity are risk markers for other underlying conditions that affect health, including
socioeconomic status, access to health care, and exposure to the virus related to occupation, e.g.,
frontline, essential, and critical infrastructure workers.”); As US Deaths Mount, Coronavirus Takes
Outsized Toll on Minorities, AL JAZEERA (Aug. 21, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/08/
deaths-mount-coronavirus-takes-outsized-toll-minorities-200821154745726.html [ https://perma.cc/
G7TQ-HLLE ] (“[D]eaths among minorities during the crisis have risen far more than they have among
white people.”).
4. See Samrachana Adhikari, Nicholas P. Pantaleo, Justin M. Feldman, Olugbenga Ogedegbe,
Lorna Thorpe & Andrea B. Troxel, Assessment of Community-Level Disparities in Coronavirus Disease
2019 (COVID-19) Infections and Deaths in Large US Metropolitan Areas, JAMA NETWORK OPEN,
July 28, 2020, at 1, 3 (finding an excess burden of infections and deaths in poorer and more diverse
areas); W. Holmes Finch & Maria E. Hernández Finch, Poverty and Covid-19: Rates of Incidence and
Deaths in the United States During the First 10 Weeks of the Pandemic, FRONTIERS SOCIO., June 2020,
at 1, 6 (finding higher COVID-19 death rates in poorer counties during the first months of
the pandemic).
5. See, e.g., Andi Egbert, The Color of Coronavirus: Response Panel, APM RSCH. LAB, https://
www.apmresearchlab.org/covid/response-panel [ https://perma.cc/M3E9-WKBU ] ( last visited
Oct. 19, 2021 ) (statement of Andrew Grant-Thomas) (“[D]ata and trends [of COVID-19] have also
encouraged a broader conversation about why this pattern of racialized vulnerability is so
painfully familiar . . . .”).
6. See Frederick J. Zimmerman & Nathaniel W. Anderson, Trends in Health Equity in the United
States by Race/Ethnicity, Sex, and Income, 1993-2017, JAMA NETWORK OPEN, June 28, 2019, at 1, 8
(finding that in the United States between 1993 and 2017, income disparities worsened and measures
of health equity and health justice declined, “hint[ing] that increasing income disparities may be
associated with stagnant health equity”). The authors suggest “policies that reduce the prevalence and
penalties associated with poverty [as a potential] starting point to improving health equity.” Id. See also
Paola Scommegna, Exploring the Paradox of U.S. Hispanics’ Longer Life Expectancy, POPULATION
REFERENCE BUREAU ( July 12, 2013), https://www.prb.org/us-hispanics-life-expectancy/
[ https://perma.cc/2EJ3-4UCS ] (“Infant and adult mortality rates are strongly associated with income
and education levels . . . .”).
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Critically, wealth and health disparities are more likely to impact Black,7 Native
American,8 and Latinx9 people,10 and these disparities are evident in the
COVID-19 data.11 For example, Black people have lower incomes and higher
poverty rates compared to other racial groups,12 and they have had the highest
COVID-19 death rate.13 This death rate mirrors general public-health outcomes for

7. In keeping with guidance from the National Association of Black Journalists Style Guide,
this Note primarily uses the term “Black” to refer to people from African, Caribbean, and Afro-Latinx
ethnic backgrounds, to be inclusive of people with black skin in the United States who may not identify
as “African Americans” because they are American citizens or do not identify with an African ethnic
background. NABJ Style Guide A, NAT’L ASS’N BLACK JOURNALISTS, https://www.nabj.org/page/
styleguideA [ https://perma.cc/23CB-4M2G ] ( last visited Oct. 19, 2021 ) (“In a story in which race is
relevant and there is no stated preference for an individual or individuals, use black because it is an
accurate description of race.”). Because the term “African American” was particularly popular in the
1980s and 1990s, this Note will use that term when a historical source refers to African Americans. See
id. This Note also capitalizes the term “Black” in an effort to “pay[ ] homage” to the struggle for
political, social, and physical acceptance into American society. See John Eligon, A Debate Over Identity
and Race Asks, Are African-Americans ‘Black’ or ‘black’?, N.Y. TIMES ( June 26, 2020), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/06/26/us/black-african-american-style-debate.html
[ https://perma.cc/376N-M2QD ] (quoting a statement made by Brittney Cooper).
8. This Note uses the term “Native American” to refer to American Indian, Alaska Native,
Native Hawaiian, and American Samoan people. Though members of indigenous tribal communities
hold a variety of preferences for the terminology used, this Note uses “Native American” because it is
inclusive of tribal communities in the continental United States and those in Alaska, Hawaii, and other
U.S. territories. See Amanda Blackhorse, Blackhorse: Do You Prefer ‘Native American’ or ‘American
Indian’? 6 Prominent Voices Respond, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, https://indiancountrytoday.com/
archive/blackhorse-do-you-prefer-native-american-or-american-indian-kHWRPJqIGU6X3FTVdMi9
EQ [ https://perma.cc/6BW6-6GLJ ] (Sept. 13, 2018) (detailing diverse preferences of six
Native-American individuals); Frequently Asked Questions, NATIVE AM. RTS. FUND, https://
www.narf.org/frequently-asked-questions/ [ https://perma.cc/X3RF-CWCZ ] ( last visited Oct. 19,
2021 ) (“[U]sage of the term [‘Native American’] has expanded to include all Native people of the United
States and its territories, including Native Hawaiians and American Samoans.”). However, where
sources cite to American Indian and Alaska Native communities, this Note uses those terms instead.
9. This Note uses the term “Latinx” in an effort to be inclusive of people of all genders who
are of Hispanic/Latino ethnic background. Graciela Mochkofsky, Who Are You Calling Latinx?, NEW
YORKER (Sept. 5, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/who-are-you-callinglatinx [ https://perma.cc/NBL4-JRSB ].
10. See, e.g., Gloria L. Beckles & Benedict I. Truman, Education and Income — United States,
2009 and 2011, 62 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 9, 15 (Supp. 2013) (finding that the “lowest
levels of education and income are most common and persistent among subgroups that systematically
exhibit the poorest health,” including Latinx, non-Hispanic Black, and American Indian/Alaska
Native people).
11. See Carlos Irwin Oronce, Christopher A. Scannell, Ichiro Kawachi & Yusuke Tsugawa,
Association Between State-Level Income Inequality and COVID-19 Cases and Mortality in the USA, 35
J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 2791 (2020); see also Risk for COVID-19 Infection, Hospitalization, and Death
by Race/Ethnicity, supra note 3.
12. See Dedrick Asante Muhammad, Rogelio Tec & Kathy Ramirez, Racial Wealth
Snapshot: American Indians/Native Americans, NAT’L CMTY. REINVESTMENT COAL. (Nov. 18, 2019),
https://ncrc.org/racial-wealth-snapshot-american-indians-native-americans/
[ https://perma.cc/
CC22-ZGBE ] (reporting a poverty rate of 20.8 percent and a median household income of $41,361 for
Black Americans, lower than all other racial groups except for American Indian and Alaskan Natives).
13. Risk for COVID-19 Infection, Hospitalization, and Death by Race/Ethnicity, supra note 3.
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Black people, including shorter lifespans14 and almost double the infant mortality
rate than the general U.S. population.15 Similarly, Native American and Latinx
populations—who have lower incomes and higher poverty rates than the white
population in the United States16—are tied for the highest COVID-19 infection
rate.17 To be sure, high COVID-19 infection and death rates have impacted every
race of the U.S. population.18 Yet the racial composition of people who have died
from COVID-19 is striking.19 After adjusting for death rates by age,20 Black, Native
American, and Latinx people are at least two times more likely to die from
COVID-19 than white people.21

14. Elizabeth Arias & Jiaquan Xu, United States Life Tables, 2017, NAT’L VITAL STAT. REPS.,
June 24, 2019, at 1, 5 (reporting a 3.5-year disparity in the life expectancy for white people (78.8 years)
and Black people (75.3 years)).
15. See Infant Mortality Rates by Race: United States, 2015-2017 Average, MARCH DIMES,
https://www.marchofdimes.org/peristats/ViewSubtopic.aspx?reg=99&top=6&stop=94&lev=1&obj
=1&cmp=&slev=1&sty=&eny=&chy=20152017 [ https://perma.cc/E6WD-37P2 ] ( last visited
Oct. 20, 2021 ).
16. See Muhammad et al., supra note 12 (reporting that Native Americans have the lowest
median income of any racial/ethnic group in the United States ($40,315) and Hispanic households have
an average income of $51,450). Native Americans also have the highest poverty rates of any
racial/ethnic group, at 25.4%, and Latinx people have a poverty rate of 17.6%. Id.
Interestingly, Latinx people in the United States have higher life expectancies than the general
U.S. population, which would not be expected given their low income and education levels relative to
the general population. See Paola Scommegna, New Studies Link U.S. Hispanics’ Longer Life Expectancy
to Migration Patterns, Less Smoking, POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU (Sept. 12, 2017), https://
www.prb.org/hispanics-life-expectancy-migration-patterns/
[ https://perma.cc/ZT8M-44E3 ]
(describing what demographers call the “Hispanic Health Paradox”). Factors that might contribute to
this phenomenon include less smoking in Latinx communities and migration patterns that may indicate
that older and less healthy Mexican-born U.S. residents migrate back to Mexico for more accessible
healthcare. Id. However, despite this long-term trend, the COVID-19 pandemic has devastated Latinx
communities in the United States, causing high rates of infection. See Risk for COVID-19 Infection,
Hospitalization, and Death by Race/Ethnicity, supra note 3. Native Americans, on the other hand, have
predictably high rates of infant mortality and low life expectancy, given their low average income and
poverty rates. See Infant Mortality, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://
www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/maternalinfanthealth/infantmortality.htm [ https://perma.cc/NM
T8-DBWW ] ( last updated Sept. 8, 2021 ) (reporting an infant mortality rate of 8.2 per 1,000 live births
for the American Indian/Alaska Native population); Disparities, INDIAN HEALTH SERV. (Oct. 2019),
https://www.ihs.gov/newsroom/factsheets/disparities/ [ https://perma.cc/Z2X2-USJ2 ] (“American
Indians and Alaska Natives born today have a life expectancy that is 5.5 years less than the [general
United States] population (73.0 years to 78.5 years, respectively).”).
17. Risk for COVID-19 Infection, Hospitalization, and Death by Race/Ethnicity, supra note 3;
see also Creede Newton, Native Americans Look to Future Amid Grim Coronavirus Numbers, AL
JAZEERA (May 5, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/05/native-americans-future-grimcoronavirus-numbers-200504222237507.html [ https://perma.cc/QPA3-UZDF ] (“The Navajo
Nation has the third-highest infection rate per capita of any region of the US.”).
18. See APM Research Lab Staff, The Color of Coronavirus: COVID-19 Deaths by Race and
Ethnicity in the U.S., APM RSCH. LAB (Mar. 5, 2021), https://www.apmresearchlab.org/covid/deathsby-race [ https://perma.cc/R2JL-NXXW ].
19. See id.
20. The study authors accounted for age disparities within the population of each race because
older people are much more likely to die from COVID-19 than younger people. Id.
21. Id.
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Disproportionately low health outcomes are linked to long-standing income
disparities in the United States.22 Income inequality is a major social issue, and it is
especially bad for people of color.23 Unfortunately, income inequality has gotten
worse over the past decades24 despite attempts to improve it.25 The 2017
Opportunity Zone (OZ) tax program is the most recent economic-development
intervention.26 The OZ program provides for low-income census tracts in each state
to be designated as “Opportunity Zones” and offers tax benefits for people who
make investments in businesses and properties in OZs.27 The purpose of the
program is to use tax benefits to incentivize the investment of trillions of dollars of
unrealized capital gains into low-income communities that “have had difficulty
attracting jobs and new business.”28 Despite the popularity of the OZ program,29
this Note reveals why the OZ program falls short of its policy goals and likely will
not be successful. Specifically, this Note argues that the program’s design makes it
an ineffective tool to generate prosperity for low-income OZ community members.
In addition to explaining the flaws of the program, this Note explains why the OZ
tax program should be replaced with economic-development policy that makes
direct cash payments to people of color and low-income community members.
Part I provides a history on “Black-capitalism”30 economic-development
policies and public-health outcomes for low-income communities. In particular, this
22. See Finch & Hernández Finch, supra note 4, at 2 (“[U]nder-resourced communities
frequently have less access to high quality health care, and [they] suffer from more illnesses that are
associated with high mortality, such as diabetes, heart disease, and pulmonary issues.”).
23. See infra Part I.
24. Juliana Menasce Horowitz, Ruth Igielnik & Rakesh Kochhar, Trends in Income and Wealth
Inequality, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2020/01/09/trends-inincome-and-wealth-inequality/ [ https://perma.cc/DX3E-6ZUK ].
25. See Matthew Freedman, Teaching New Markets Old Tricks: The Effects of Subsidized
Investment on Low-Income Neighborhoods, 96 J. PUB. ECON. 1000, 1001, 1009 (2012) (describing the New
Market Tax Credit (NMTC) low-income community-development program); Dina Schlossberg,
Empowerment Zones/Enterprise Communities: The New Cure for Distressed Urban Communities or the
Same Old Band-Aid?, 2 HYBRID: J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 33, 35–36 (1994) (describing the Empowerment
Zones/Enterprise Community economic-development program).
26. See I.R.C. §§ 1400Z-1 to -2.
27. Id.
28. The Promise of Opportunity Zones: Hearing Before the J. Econ. Comm., 115th Cong. 1–2 (2018)
(statement of Rep. Erik Paulson, Chairman, J. Econ. Comm.).
29. See, e.g., Press Release, Tim Scott, U.S. Sen. for S.C., Senator Scott Introduces the Bipartisan
Investing in Opportunity Act (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.scott.senate.gov/media-center/pressreleases/senator-scott-introduces-the-bipartisan-investing-in-opportunity-act
[ https://perma.cc/
LZ8E-CCXV ] (claiming that the OZ program will address “widening geographic disparities and
increasingly uneven economic growth” by subsidizing investments in American communities that have
been “left behind”); Steven Bertoni, An Unlikely Group of Billionaires and Politicians Has Created the
Most Unbelievable Tax Break Ever, FORBES ( July 18, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
forbesdigitalcovers/2018/07/17/an-unlikely-group-of-billionaires-and-politicians-has-created-themost-unbelievable-tax-break-ever/#12dcb4541485 [ https://perma.cc/3YPF-JDVE ] (quoting Senator
Cory Booker saying, “[G]et the best investment minds coming into our communities [and] we can end
up creating jobs and opportunity”).
30. Black capitalism started as a campaign slogan and became the central pillar of President
Richard Nixon’s racial policy. It focused on promoting Black people’s entrepreneurship as a way to
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Note shows that Black-capitalism initiatives have been intermittent and inconsistent
and continue to suffer from a lack of strategic oversight by the federal government.
Part II describes the design of the OZ program and the optimism about it. Using
legislative history and OZ project data, this Note shows how the OZ program is a
new iteration of economic-development policy aimed at pacifying people of color’s
efforts to seek substantive economic reform while appealing to the sensibilities of
white and middle-class voters.31 Part III argues that solutions to income inequality
and economic stagnation lie in direct payment programs to low-income community
members to help alleviate poverty and enable more people to go to school. This
Note describes how wealth redistribution programs, including reparations and
universal basic income, are necessary to correct income inequality and prevent
future public-health crises.
I. WEALTH AND HEALTH GAPS
The United States has a long-standing history of legally and socially
marginalizing people of color32 that has created extreme wealth and health
inequalities between Black, Native American, and Latinx populations and their
white counterparts.33 This Part discusses the history of U.S. laws and programs that
solve racial inequality and quell racial unrest in ghettos across the United States in the late 1960s. See
infra Section I.B. and accompanying footnotes. Presidents since Nixon have supported subsequent
iterations of Black-capitalism policies, including the New Markets Tax Credit and Empowerment and
Enterprise Zones. Id.
31. See Robert E. Weems, Jr. & Lewis A. Randolph, The National Response to Richard
M. Nixon’s Black Capitalism Initiative: The Success of Domestic Detente, 32 J. BLACK STUD. 66, 67
(2001); see also Mehrsa Baradaran, We Need More Government, Not Less, in the War on Poverty,
WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/
2017/12/08/we-need-more-government-not-less-in-the-war-on-poverty/ [ https://perma.cc/UU8Q3WFN ] (describing the history of ineffective economic-development policies that have “left black
communities trapped in poverty while white politicians pat themselves on the back for taking ineffectual
half-measures whose main virtue is their acceptability to white constituents”).
32. Linde Riphagen, Marginalization of African-Americans in the Social Sphere of US Society, 5
INTERDISC. J. INT’L STUD., 96, 99–102 (2008) (describing the history of marginalization and current
data revealing disparate social outcomes for Black people in the United States); Mary G. Findling, Logan
S. Casey, Stephanie A. Fryberg, Steven Hafner, Robert J. Blendon, John M. Benson, Justin M. Sayde
& Carolyn Miller, Discrimination in the United States: Experiences of Native Americans, 54 HEALTH
SERVS. RSCH. 1431, 1432 (2019) (discussing impacts of “[c]enturies of massive trauma, genocide, forced
migration, segregation, and discrimination” in Native American communities); Erin Blakemore,
The Brutal History of Anti-Latino Discrimination in America, HISTORY (Aug. 29, 2018),
https://www.history.com/news/the-brutal-history-of-anti-latino-discrimination-in-america [ https://
perma.cc/P3RY-WG8B ] (describing how the end of the Mexican-American War in 1848 created a
sizeable Mexican-American population, which set off the first wave of Latino-American discrimination
in the United States).
33. See, e.g., Beckles & Truman, supra note 10; see also infra Section I.C. This Section primarily
discusses the policies and laws that impacted Black people because there were far greater numbers of
Black people in the United States than other racial/ethnic minority groups. See Campbell Gibson
& Kay Jung, Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals by Race, 1790 to 1990, and by Hispanic
Origin, 1970 to 1990, for Large Cities and Other Urban Places in the United States (U.S. Census Bureau,
Working Paper No. 76, 2005), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/workingpapers/2005/demo/POP-twps0076.pdf [ https://perma.cc/J5H8-6MWA ]. However, policies of
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have created systemic racism and institutionalized wealth disparities through
targeted community disinvestment.
A. The Development of Racialized Wealth Inequality in the United States
Since the initial European colonization of the area now comprising the United
States, ethnic minorities have had limited economic opportunities. Starting in the
early 1600s, colonizers stole land and resources from Native American tribal
communities;34 kidnapped, transported, and enslaved African people;35 and vilified
non-Anglo immigrants as threats to society.36
After the Emancipation Proclamation ended the institution of slavery in
1863,37 there was a movement to provide formerly enslaved people land
reparations.38 Land reparations received substantial mainstream support, and in
1865, President Abraham Lincoln signed the Freedmen’s Bureau Act, which
provided for each Black male to have “forty acres at a low price on long credit.”39
People opposed to land reparations argued newly freed Black people would use

forced removal also sowed the seeds of extreme wealth and health disparities in Native
American communities.
Notably, Asian Americans, though racial minorities in the United States and considered people
of color, actually have higher incomes and life expectancies than white people in the United States.
Francesco Acciai, Aggie J. Noah & Glenn Firebaugh, Pinpointing the Sources of the Asian Mortality
Advantage in the United States, 69 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & CMTY. HEALTH 1006, 1007 (2015). Although
Asian immigrants were legally marginalized in the United States, similar to other racial minority groups,
this racial population does not have the same economic and health disadvantages as other populations
of color in the United States today. This Note does not examine the historical, cultural, and legal
influences that have led to higher wealth and health attainment for this racial population. Instead, this
Note focuses on Black, Native American, and Latinx communities, who are the racial populations that
experience most economic and health inequalities in the United States.
34. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823) (holding that Native Americans did not have
the right to sell property to entities other than the federal government).
35. Early American Slavery in the Colonies and the Hardening of Racial Distinctions, in 1 SLAVERY
IN THE UNITED STATES: A SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 84, 87–90 ( Junius
P. Rodriguez ed., 2007). Even free Black people were legally prohibited from owning property in many
states. MEHRSA BARADARAN, THE COLOR OF MONEY: BLACK BANKS AND THE RACIAL WEALTH
GAP 11–12 (2017).
36. Immigration to the United States, 1851-1900, LIBR. CONG., https://www.loc.gov/
classroom-materials/united-states-history-primary-source-timeline/rise-of-industrial-america-1876-19
00/immigration-to-united-states-1851-1900/ [ https://perma.cc/GTS8-XZYV ] ( last visited Oct. 20,
2021 ) (“With the onset of hard economic times in the 1870s, European immigrants and Americans
began to compete for the jobs traditionally reserved for the Chinese. With economic competition came
dislike and even racial suspicion and hatred. Such feelings were accompanied by anti-Chinese riots [and
efforts to end Chinese immigration].”).
37. The Emancipation Proclamation, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/exhibits/
featured-documents/emancipation-proclamation#:~:text=President [ https://perma.cc/S9B5-28ND ]
(Aug. 5, 2021).
38. BARADARAN, supra note 35, at 15.
39. Id. at 16 (quoting Walter L. Fleming, “Forty Acres and a Mule.,” 182 N. AM. REV. 721, 729
(1906)); Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507. See also Freedmen’s Bureau Acts of 1865 and 1866,
U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/FreedmensBureau
.htm [ https://perma.cc/FY25-YHRJ ] ( last visited Oct. 20, 2021 ).
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their land to plant subsistence crops, rather than valuable cotton, and the loss of
this export would have widespread negative impacts on the U.S. economy.40
Unfortunately, after President Lincoln was assassinated, President Andrew Johnson
opposed Reconstruction efforts in the South and vetoed legislation that would have
renewed the Freedmen’s Bureau legislation.41 Subsequently, southerners used
violence and terror to keep Black people away from their newly obtained lands, and
federal administrators took back land from Black people who remained on their
land despite threats and violence.42 There had been hopes during Reconstruction
for a redistribution of wealth and potentially even racial equality, but when
Reconstruction failed in 1877,43 no such legal or economic changes took place.44
Instead, Black codes45 stifled the free movement of Black people in the market by
preventing them from working in most occupations and limiting their
civic participation.46
In the decades following the Civil War, economic policy and practices
supported a racial hierarchy and employment segregation.47 Even people from
European ethnic backgrounds such as Italian, Polish, and Eastern
European—people who today are legally and culturally considered white—were not
considered to be white and were marginalized in the economic and political
realms.48 Union policies prevented people of different racial and ethnic groups from

40. BARADARAN, supra note 35, at 19–20.
41. Freedmen’s Bureau Acts of 1865 and 1866, supra note 39.
42. BARADARAN, supra note 35, at 16–17.
43. Black Codes and Pig Laws, PBS, https://www.pbs.org/tpt/slavery-by-another-name/
themes/black-codes-and-pig-laws/ [ https://perma.cc/LWR4-E7UC ] ( last visited Oct. 20, 2021 ).
44. BARADARAN, supra note 35, at 16, 21–22.
45. Black codes were southern state laws that regulated and limited the movement, labor, and
activities of formerly enslaved people. Black Codes of Mississippi, TEACHING AM. HIST., https://
teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/black-codes-of-mississippi/ [ https://perma.cc/CE7
U-RB3C ] ( last visited Oct. 20, 2021 ).
46. BARADARAN, supra note 35, at 20. Southern criminal laws also limited Black people’s
movement and freedom. Id. at 21 (describing “vagrancy violations,” which could be used to arrest Black
men who were not working for a white landlord).
47. Richard Rothstein, A History of Residential Segregation in the United States, IRP FOCUS,
March 2019, at 2, 2–3; see also David E. Hamilton, Herbert Hoover: The American Franchise, MILLER
CTR., https://millercenter.org/president/hoover/the-american-franchise [ https://perma.cc/6ZLT2Y59 ] ( last visited Oct. 20, 2021 ) (“The majority of newcomers to the United States were of southern
or eastern European descent . . . and worked in low-paying, blue-collar occupations . . . .”).
48. Kamala Kelkar, How a Shifting Definition of ‘White’ Helped Shape U.S. Immigration Policy,
PBS NEWS HOUR WEEKEND (Sept. 16, 2017, 1:51 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/
white-u-s-immigration-policy [ https://perma.cc/H2HL-VUTN ] (discussing how people from
Southern and Eastern Europe were not considered “purely” white in the early 1900s). Part of the reason
Italian immigrants were not considered “white” was that they were willing to work in lower-wage jobs.
For example, in Louisiana, Italians worked on plantations and lived alongside Black people. Brent
Staples, Opinion, How Italians Became ‘White,’ N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/10/12/opinion/columbus-day-italian-american-racism.html
[ https://perma.cc/8WF4-NDNZ ]. See also Rothstein, supra note 47.
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entering certain professions and practicing skilled trades.49 Interestingly, this
employment segregation supported racially integrated urban neighborhoods
because working class people—mostly white immigrants and Black people—lived
near jobs in factories and transit centers in the downtown area of cities.50
Unfortunately, the Great Depression of the late 1920s and 1930s, and the
federal government’s policy response to it, destabilized working-class communities,
and Black populations were most devastatingly impacted.51 The Great Depression
caused many people to lose their jobs and housing.52 In response, the federal
government created many workplace protections.53 But the positions commonly
held by Black people—farming and domestic servitude—were exempted from these
protections. This exemption had the effect of denying Black people the wage
growth and workplace-quality increases the new federal protections engendered.54
To respond to the Great Depression’s housing crisis, the Roosevelt administration’s
Public Works Administration initially planned to develop low-cost apartment
buildings in urban centers across the country.55 The plan was scrapped, however, in
an effort to obtain private investments for housing development; officials replaced
plans to rebuild affordable apartment buildings with plans for lucrative
single-family homes.56
New Deal agencies and laws subsidized low-income home buyers but denied
Black people access to these federally funded programs.57 In 1936, the Home

49. E.g., Paul Moreno, Unions and Discrimination, 30 CATO J. 67, 71 (2010) (describing how
labor leaders promoted racial egalitarianism at the federation level but failed to address the
discriminatory policies implemented at the national and local union levels); A Brief History of Labor,
Race and Solidarity, AFL-CIO LAB. COMM’N ON RACIAL & ECON. JUST., https://racialjustice.aflcio.org/blog/est-aliquid-se-ipsum-flagitiosum-etiamsi-nulla [ https://perma.cc/3ZUD-9HWL ]
( last visited Oct. 20, 2021 ).
50. See Rothstein, supra note 47, at 2–3 (describing how the mostly white neighborhood of West
Oakland, California, had a small Black population who worked for the transit company whose line
started there).
51. See Christopher Klein, Last Hired, First Fired: How the Great Depression Affected African
Americans, HISTORY (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.history.com/news/last-hired-first-fired-how-thegreat-depression-affected-african-americans#:~:text=African-American
[ https://perma.cc/7YM5AF2Y ] (noting that Black unemployment rates across the country were double or triple that of the local
white population).
52. James Gregory, Hoovervilles and Homelessness, GREAT DEPRESSION WASH. STATE
PROJECT, https://depts.washington.edu/depress/hooverville.shtml [ https://perma.cc/L246-LE2J ]
( last visited October 20, 2021 ) (noting that following the stock market crash and subsequent job loss,
homeowners lost their property and renters were evicted, leading millions of Americans to live outside
the normal rent-paying housing market by 1932).
53. BARADARAN, supra note 35, at 101–02.
54. Id. at 103 (describing how the majority of Black southerners were excluded from
workplace-protection legislation including wage and hour protections and the right to unionize). In the
North, Union membership was frequently restricted to white members, so the benefits obtained by
many union organizations did not extend to Black people. Id. at 102.
55. LOUIS HYMAN, DEBTOR NATION: THE HISTORY OF AMERICA IN RED INK 51 (2011).
56. Id. at 51–52; BARADARAN, supra note 35, at 104.
57. Charles L. Nier, III, Perpetuation of Segregation: Toward a New Historical and Legal
Interpretation of Redlining Under the Fair Housing Act, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 617, 619–27 (1999).
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Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) mapped neighborhoods across the country to
determine a home’s potential to appreciate in order to create standardized home
appraisals.58 Neighborhoods were categorized largely by their racial makeup, and
the least desirable neighborhoods were colored red (“redlined”).59 The HOLC
created policies that discouraged lending for purchases in neighborhoods that were
racially heterogenous and predominantly Black.60 Because Black people were denied
loans for home purchases (both in cities and in suburbs), they were deprived of
homeownership as a path to wealth.61 This disparate treatment contributed to
intergenerational wealth disparities between Black and white people.62
Redlining policy also incentivized white flight and led to the formation of
ghettos: desolate, poverty-stricken, urban communities.63 While Black people were
trapped in ghettos, federal home-lending policies incentivized white people to leave
urban neighborhoods because federally backed mortgage credit was mostly only
available for home purchases in white neighborhoods.64 To aid in the transportation
of workers from their new suburban homes to downtown jobs, the United States
poured millions of dollars into construction programs that bulldozed, bifurcated,
and walled in urban communities, thereby physically separating and isolating
ghetto communities.65
Decades after the Great Depression, New Deal programs solidified a new
white middle class.66 Yet Black communities were cut out of those wealth-building
programs and faced systemic racism and economic deprivation.67 Not only were
Black people unemployed at higher rates, denied access to credit that would allow
58. Mapping Inequality: Redlining in New Deal America, U. RICH. DIGIT. SCHOLARSHIP LAB,
https://dsl.richmond.edu/panorama/redlining/#loc=5/39.1/-94.58&text=intro [ https://perma.cc/
QZ32-BLCP ] ( last visited Oct. 20, 2021 ).
59. Id.
60. See FED. HOUS. ADMIN., UNDERWRITING MANUAL: UNDERWRITING AND VALUATION
PROCEDURE UNDER TITLE II OF THE NATIONAL HOUSING ACT pt. 3, § 13, para. 1360 (1938) (“The
infiltration of inharmonious racial groups . . . tend[s] to lower the levels of land values and to lessen the
desirability of residential areas.”). See also BARADARAN, supra note 35, at 105 (“[R]ace was a greater
factor in a neighborhood’s predicted decline than other structural characteristics such as the age of
homes, proximity to city centers, creditworthiness of residents, transportation opportunities, public
parks, or any other features.”).
61. Nier, supra note 57, at 618–19 (“[M]ortgage lending discrimination in the form of racial
redlining . . . limits minority access to homeownership.”).
62. Id.
63. Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489, 496–97 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (“Little
imagination is required to understand that the imposition of barriers to occupancy in the form of higher
mortgage-interest rates or refusals to make loans in connection with housing in changing
neighborhoods works to discourage families, white or black, which could afford to purchase homes in
such neighborhoods. The practical effect is to discourage whites-who may freely move elsewhere-from
moving into vacancies in ‘changing’ neighborhoods, thereby inducing ‘massive transition’ and,
ultimately, ‘white flight.’ Thus, according to this view, redlining directly contributes to the decay of
our cities.”).
64. Id.
65. BARADARAN, supra note 35, at 104–05.
66. Id. at 103.
67. See Nier, supra note 57, at 618, 619.
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them to become homeowners, and frequently prevented from entering
higher-paying jobs, their more affluent, white neighbors had fled their
neighborhoods, leaving behind poorer tax bases and schools.68 Additionally, due to
mainstream banking practices, many Black people lacked access to credit for smaller
purchases and ventures.69 This lack of mainstream credit created a market for
predatory credit providers whose practices ultimately led to further wealth
diminishment in Black households.70 For decades, Black community members
worked to create alternative Black banks that would meet their communities’ credit
needs and help build local wealth, but these efforts continually failed due to federal
policies that actively restricted and neglected wealth-building efforts in
Black communities.71
In the 1960s, activists and leaders in the Civil Rights Movement proposed
policies to combat this deep economic, political, and social inequality.72 President
John F. Kennedy encouraged Congress to pass broad civil-rights policies, including
integrating schools and restricting government funding for programs practicing
discrimination.73 His successor, President Lyndon Johnson, supported and passed
the Civil Rights Act in 1964, conferring legal equality on Black people—yet
civil-rights leaders’ calls for economic policies to correct centuries of wealth
deprivation went unanswered.74 Many white people argued that Black people should
not be given government support and subsidies because that would go against the

68. John A. Gibson, K-12 School Funding and Resource Allocation: The Effect of White Flight
on Education Funding Among Public School Districts in Rust Belt States (2010) (Ph.D. dissertation,
Northern Illinois University) (ProQuest) (finding “significant correlations between White flight and
property tax revenue reductions in 12 of 16 Rust Belt cities from 1960 to 2000 [and] statistical evidence
of disparities in property tax revenue among school districts with high minority enrollments”).
69. BARADARAN, supra note 35, at 75–76 (describing how mainstream banks, such as the banks
in Harlem, would not make loans to Black people, and how Black banks sprang up in Northern cities
to fill this need). Unfortunately, these banks generally failed due to heavy loan losses because Black
ghetto properties lost their value. Id. at 87.
70. Douglas S. Massey, Jacob S. Rugh, Justin P. Steil & Len Albright, Riding the Stagecoach to
Hell: A Qualitative Analysis of Racial Discrimination in Mortgage Lending, 15 CITY & CMTY. 118, 120,
122–23 (2016); BARADARAN, supra note 35, at 144 (noting that although credit cards had become
popular in the 1960s, they were not widely available to Black people, who instead paid for purchases
with high-cost installment credit).
71. BARADARAN, supra note 35, at 76, 127.
72. See, e.g., The Black Panthers: Ten Point Program, BLACK LIVES MATTER SYLLABUS, http://
www.blacklivesmattersyllabus.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/BPP_Ten_Point_Program.pdf
[ http://web.archive.org/web/20210605044926/http://www.blacklivesmattersyllabus.com/wp-content/
uploads/2016/07/BPP_Ten_Point_Program.pdf ] ( last visited June. 5, 2021 ) (demanding the “overdue
debt of forty acres and two mules”).
73. Civil Rights Movement, JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & MUSEUM, https://
www.jfklibrary.org/learn/about-jfk/jfk-in-history/civil-rights-movement
[ https://perma.cc/J876EYAQ ] ( last visited Oct. 20, 2021 ).
74. BARADARAN, supra note 35, at 135, 137–38 (explaining how Bayard Rustin and Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr. called for economic programs including housing integration, the allocation of public
funds for economic development, and specific privileges for Black people to obtain equality).
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notion of equality under the law.75 In response, President Johnson created the
“Great Society” program and waged a “War on Poverty” that supported poor (not
“Black”) people’s economic advancement without altering the legal framework that
created the wealth gap between white and Black people.76 Instead of creating
programs to help Black people build capital, President Johnson’s efforts were
focused on charity by providing food, income assistance, and educational
opportunities, such as job training and early childhood education programs.77
B. Black-Capitalism Policy
As he campaigned for president, Richard Nixon simultaneously quelled calls
for equality from Black people and concerns about racial unrest from white people
by promoting “Black capitalism,” which he said would create “bridges” between the
two populations.78 By advocating for bridges between the two economies—the Black,
ghetto economy and the white, government-subsidized economy—he voiced his
support for segregated economies,79 appealing to white voters and some Black
activists and leaders.80
Nixon subverted Black activists’ rhetoric of Black Power and Black economic
independence by advocating for Black capitalism, urging that Black people should
raise themselves up to equality by building businesses.81 “Black Power” had been a
popular slogan among racial-justice leaders and advocates, including the
revolutionary socialist organization the Black Panther Party.82 Black Power
emphasized economic independence from white people through property, business,
and institutional ownership.83 Black economic independence was also popular
among more moderate civil-rights leaders who had become disheartened about the
United States’ political will for integration.84 Nixon used the Black-capitalism

75. Id. at 138 (“[W]hites demanded that blacks not be given any special favors based on
their race.”).
76. See id. at 151.
77. Id.
78. ROBERT E. WEEMS, JR. & LEWIS A. RANDOLPH, BUSINESS IN BLACK AND
WHITE: AMERICAN PRESIDENTS AND BLACK ENTREPRENEURS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 6
(2009); see also BARADARAN, supra note 35, at 164–65, 178; Mehrsa Baradaran, A Bad Check for Black
America, BOS. REV. (Nov. 9, 2017) [ hereinafter Baradaran, A Bad Check ], http://bostonreview.net/
class-inequality-race/mehrsa-baradaran-bad-check-black-america [ https://perma.cc/A46Z-M8H5 ].
79. See Baradaran, A Bad Check, supra note 78.
80. See WEEMS & RANDOLPH, supra note 78; Dean Kotlowski, Black Power—Nixon Style: The
Nixon Administration and Minority Business Enterprise, 72 BUS. HIST. REV. 409, 410–11 (1998);
Baradaran, A Bad Check, supra note 78.
81. Kotlowski, supra note 80, at 411.
82. Black Power, NAT’L ARCHIVES (Mar. 16, 2021), https://www.archives.gov/research/
african-americans/black-power [ https://perma.cc/WE2B-C7QC ].
83. The Black Panthers: Ten Points Program, supra note 72.
84. BARADARAN, supra note 35, at 162–64, 171; see also The Black Panthers: Ten Points Program,
supra note 72.
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rhetoric to suggest responsiveness to the trends and demands of the
Black community.85
The Black-capitalism slogan was likewise appealing to white voters and their
elected representatives.86 Capitalism and entrepreneurship resonated with
middle-class voters’ bootstrap mentality.87 At the same time, Nixon’s emphasis on
self-help and ending welfare dependency provided legitimacy for slashing
social-support programs for Black people.88 While he campaigned, he kept the
mechanics of Black capitalism vague,89 but he promised that the program would
be cheap.90
After his election, President Nixon fulfilled his Black-capitalism promises by
creating the Department of Commerce’s Office of Minority Business Enterprise
(OMBE), whose mission was to coordinate the federal government’s
minority-business programs and promote stories of Black entrepreneurial success.91
There was no budget for OMBE to create its own minority business development
programs—the only mandate was the promotion of minority business-development
activities by state and local governments and private and nonprofit actors.92
Although President Nixon “promoted Black capitalism as a major remedy for
America’s racial ills,”93 the Nixon administration ultimately provided minimal
assistance to Black entrepreneurs.94 The Black-capitalism programs included the
failed Minority Enterprise Small Business Investment Company’s program,95 the

85. Kotlowski, supra note 80, at 412.
86. BARADARAN, supra note 35, at 164–66.
87. Id. at 164–65.
88. Id. at 177. His campaign also argued that the race riots of 1968, which erupted in ghettos
after Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated, were caused by government aid. Id.
89. 2 STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, NIXON: THE TRIUMPH OF A POLITICIAN, 1962-1972, at 154
(1989). The Black-capitalism policy also sought to support locally owned businesses in the United
States’ ghettos. Id. “Nixon had not yet worked out many of the details of bringing the benefits of free
enterprise to the inner cities . . . .” Id. He committed to induce businesses to invest in ghettos and
support locally owned businesses in ghettos. Id. at 125, 154.
90. BARADARAN, supra note 35, at 164.
91. Exec. Order No. 11,458, 34 Fed. Reg. 4,937 (Mar. 5, 1969); Baradaran, A Bad Check, supra
note 78, (“[T]he most important objective of the OMBE was to manufacture and broadcast
success stories . . . .”).
92. Exec. Order No. 11,458.
93. Weems & Randolph, supra note 31, at 67.
94. WEEMS & RANDOLPH, supra note 78, at 7. The program was designed to attract private
investment in Black businesses. Id. at 6.
95. Timothy Bates, Government as Financial Intermediary for Minority Entrepreneurs: An
Evaluation, 48 J. BUS. 541, 541 (1975). The program failed because its business model did not make
sense and the program was underfunded. Id. The businesses enrolled in the program were entirely debt
financed, and outside investors did not have equity in the companies, which meant that the businesses
had little cushion to absorb market shocks. Market shocks were more likely because the businesses were
based in low-income, high-crime communities. BARADARAN, supra note 35, at 183. Furthermore,
Nixon’s programs were focused on creating small businesses that “were the most vulnerable and least
likely to succeed in this environment.” Baradaran, A Bad Check, supra note 78.

First to Printer_Raitz.docx (Do Not Delete)

2021]

PUBLIC HEALTH AND RACIAL INEQUALITY

11/16/21 7:28 AM

329

Small Business Authority minority set-aside program,96 the Minority Bank Deposit
Program,97 and affirmative-action policies initiated by the Equal Opportunity
Office.98 The initiatives were grossly inadequate to address any of the causes of
wealth inequality between Black and white people: disparate access to government
programs, government-sanctioned housing segregation, and denial of credit.99
President Nixon’s policy stood in stark contrast to the suggested economic-justice
reforms championed by civil-rights activists, such as targeted housing integration,
busing and integration of schools,100 and reparations programs.101
Although the federal government and members of the private sector have
criticized Black capitalism as a solution to racial-wealth disparities,102 it enjoys
continued popularity among policymakers. Despite Black capitalism’s failure to
address racialized economic inequality, both the rhetoric and market-based policy
of Black capitalism have held prominent places in the racial-equity and
community-development agendas of subsequent presidential administrations.103
C. The Enduring Legacy of Black Capitalism
Every president after President Nixon has promoted a form of
Black-capitalism policy.104 Although President Gerald Ford rebranded “Black
capitalism” to “minority enterprise,” he continued the Nixon administration’s
programs, including the minority set-aside program.105 President Jimmy Carter
promoted minority enterprise106 while simultaneously cutting or reducing social

96. Baradaran, A Bad Check, supra note 78. This program helped minority-owned businesses to
receive government contracts. Id.
97. Id. This program encouraged federal agencies to make deposits in minority banks. Id.
98. Id. Affirmative action encouraged companies to hire more Black employees. Id.
99. See Weems & Randolph, supra note 31, at 68; see also BARADARAN, supra note 35, at 178.
100. AMBROSE, supra note 89, at 175.
101. BARADARAN, supra note 35, at 172–74. Baradaran describes various reparations policy
proposals including $15 for every Black person in the United States, totaling $500 million to be paid by
Christian churches and synagogues (advanced by James Forman of the Black Panthers); land for a
“Republic of New Africa” in the South (advanced by Black separatists); ten percent of the United States’
Fortune 500 companies put under Black control (advanced by Economist Richard F. America Jr.); the
Ghetto Economic Development and Industrialization Plan that required outside funds, including $200
million from New York City, to support economic development in ghettos (advanced by banker
Dunbar S. McLaurin); and the Community Self-Determination Bill that would create Community
Development Corporations that would be owned by ghetto residents and supported with seed credit
from the Treasury (advanced by the Congress of Racial Equity (CORE) and introduced in the Senate
in 1968). Id.
102. See, e.g., Phillip H. Wiggins, Blacks Debate Black Capitalism, N.Y. TIMES ( Jan. 10, 1971)
https://www.nytimes.com/1971/01/10/archives/blacks-debate-black-capitalism.html [ https://perma.cc/
5WZ5-2B8G ] (“[T]he clenched fist of militancy has broken down few boardroom barriers.”).
103. WEEMS & RANDOLPH, supra note 78, at 7–9; BARADARAN, supra note 35, at 220.
104. BARADARAN, supra note 35, at 220.
105. Id.
106. Id.

First to Printer_Raitz.docx (Do Not Delete)

330

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

11/16/21 7:28 AM

[Vol. 12:315

programs that were vitally important to Black people.107 President Ronald Reagan
increased the federal government’s emphasis on Black capitalism by arguing that
instead of welfare, tax breaks were the key to alleviating economic hardship in
minority communities.108 He called inner-city communities “enterprise zones,”
reduced regulations, and provided tax cuts to lure businesses to
those communities.109
President George H. W. Bush, Sr., oversaw changes to the tax code that had
mixed but overall negative impacts on low-income housing. The U.S. Tax Reform
Act of 1986 (TRA86) reduced certain incentives for rental-housing investment110
and created the Black-capitalism program called the Low-Income Housing Tax
Credit (LIHTC)111 “partly to mitigate the impact of [the reforms] on low-income
housing construction.”112 Although the LIHTC helped spur affordable housing
development, it was insufficient to make up for the lost investment incentives.113
Overall, TRA86’s changes to rental-housing investment incentives contributed to a
decrease in the construction of multifamily homes from 515,000 in 1985 to only
140,000 by 1991, despite increased need for such housing.114

107. Mfanya D. Tryman, Was Jesse Jackson a Third Party Candidate in 1988?, BLACK SCHOLAR,
Jan.–Feb. 1989, at 19, 27 (1989).
108. BARADARAN, supra note 35, at 221.
109. Id. at 222.
110. See Alex Muresianu, Did 1986 Tax Reform Hurt Affordable Housing?, TAX FOUND. ( July
1, 2020), https://taxfoundation.org/1986-tax-reform-hurt-affordable-housing/ [ https://perma.cc/
F7QU-HQXV ] (describing how the reform’s longer depreciation schedules for residential structures
and new limitations on passive loss deduction negatively impacted investing in rental construction).
111. I.R.C. § 42.
112. Muresianu, supra note 110. This program provides subsidies through taxes to promote the
construction and improvement of affordable rental housing for low-income households. What Is the
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit and How Does It Work?, TAX POL’Y CTR., https://www.tax
policycenter.org/briefing-book/what-low-income-housing-tax-credit-and-how-does-it-work [ https://
perma.cc/JVX9-6T8M ] ( last visited Oct. 20, 2021 ).
113. Muresianu, supra note 110 (“On net, TRA86 favored owner-occupied housing over
investment in rental housing.”).
114. James M. Poterba, Taxation and Housing: Old Questions, New Answers 8 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 3963, 1992).
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While supporting racial-wealth-promoting laws including the Earned Income
Tax Credit (EITC),115 Early Head Start,116 and minimum-wage increases,117
President Bill Clinton also increased spending on Black-capitalism programs by
creating tax benefits to encourage private investments in low-income communities
through the Empowerment Zone (EZ), Enterprise Community (EC), and Renewal
Community (RC) programs.118 Clinton additionally signed another Black-capitalism
program, the New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC), into law just before leaving
office.119 These public-private partnership policies were all examples of Clinton’s
“Third Way” policies that purported to use market forces to improve people’s
lives.120 President George W. Bush, Jr., enacted and expanded the LIHTC121 and

115. I.R.C. § 32. The EITC is a refundable tax credit, meaning that eligible recipients who do
not owe taxes still receive the benefit. See MARGOT L. CRANDALL-HOLLICK, GENE FALK & CONOR
F. BOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43805, THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT (EITC): HOW IT WORKS
AND WHO RECEIVES IT 1 (2020). The EITC credit is primarily for low-wage workers, and eligibility is
based on the recipient’s income, residence, children, and age requirements for those without qualifying
children. Id. at 1–6. The credit phases out once an individual’s income reaches statutory limits. Id. at 8.
116. 42 U.S.C. § 9840a. Early Head Start provides child-development supports and other
services to low-income pregnant women and families with infants and toddlers from birth to age three.
The Head Start program began in 1965 and focused on children ages four and up; funding for the Head
Start program additionally increased by forty-three percent under the Clinton administration. Childcare
Accomplishments: The Clinton Administration and Child Care, WHITEHOUSE 2 (Oct. 23, 1997), https:/
/clintonwhitehouse2.archives.gov/WH/New/Childcare/acomplish.html [ http://web.archive.org/web/
20210516032955/https://clintonwhitehouse2.archives.gov/WH/New/Childcare/acomplish.html ].
117. Richard W. Stevenson, Clinton Signs a Bill Raising Minimum Wage by 90 Cents,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 1996), https://www.nytimes.com/1996/08/21/us/clinton-signs-a-bill-raisingminimum-wage-by-90-cents.html [ https://perma.cc/7224-UR2S ].
118. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312
(establishing the EZ/EC program and its package of grants and tax benefits); Taxpayer Relief Act of
1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (designating additional EC/EZ zones); Omnibus Consolidated
and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681
(designating additional rural ECs); Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554,
114 Stat. 2763 (establishing the RC program); American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-357,
118 Stat. 1418 (expanding RC boundaries based on new census data). The initial phases of these
programs offered grants and tax incentives for community and economic development, but the later
iterations of the policy primarily offered tax incentives for business development. U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-464R, REVITALIZATION PROGRAMS: EMPOWERMENT ZONES,
ENTERPRISE COMMUNITIES, AND RENEWAL COMMUNITIES (2010).
119. H.R.4577 - Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, CONGRESS.GOV, https://
www.congress.gov/bill/106th-congress/house-bill/4577/all-actions?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5
B%22cite%3APL106-554%22%5D%7D&s=1&r=1&overview=closed#tabs [ http://web.archive.org
/web/20211012201457/https://www.congress.gov/bill/106th-congress/house-bill/4577/all-actions
?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5%20B%22cite%3APL106-554%22%5D%7D&s=1&r=1&overview
=closed ] ( last visited Oct. 12, 2021 ). The Community Renewal Tax Relief Act created the NMTC,
which provides tax credits to investors who make investments in Community Development Entities
that invest in low-income communities.
120. Julia Sass Rubin & Gregory M. Stankiewicz, The New Markets Tax Credit Program: A
Midcourse Assessment, 1 CMTY. DEV. INV. REV. 1, 1 (2005).
121. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654
(modifying the LIHTC and temporarily increasing the LIHTC cap).
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the NMTC.122 President Barack Obama further expanded the Black-capitalism
community-development model with the Promise Zones Initiative, which aimed to
encourage private investment in designated high-poverty areas.123
Like the previous iterations of Black-capitalism policies, President Donald
Trump’s 2017 OZ program provides financial incentives and benefits to private
developers and investors to engage in business development in low-income
communities.124 The long history of and varied approaches to Black-capitalist
development policies provide ample opportunity for evaluating the efficacy of these
programs. Overall, studies indicate these policies are ineffective drivers of
community development and frequently yield outcomes counter to the stated goals
of the policies. For example, though still in operation, the LIHTC is heavily
criticized for its inefficiency.125 Evaluations of the EZ/EC/RC incentives
determined that the programs are wasteful from a cost-per-job perspective.126 At
best, the impacts of the NMTC are unclear,127 but this mediocre outcome is
122. Benson F. Roberts, The Political History of and Prospects for Reauthorizing New Markets, 1
CMTY. DEV. INV. REV. 21, 27–29 (2005) (detailing President Bush’s role in administering and
supporting the NMTC, signed into law by President Clinton just before President Bush took office).
123. Fact Sheet: President Obama’s Promise Zones Initiative, OBAMA WHITE HOUSE ( Jan. 8,
2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/08/fact-sheet-presidentobama-s-promise-zones-initiative [ https://perma.cc/K2NK-VS2L ] (focusing on “partnering with
local communities and businesses to create jobs, increase economic security, expand educational
opportunities, increase access to quality, affordable housing and improve public safety”). Although
the initiative envisioned tax benefits for private businesses investing in designated Promise Zones,
the Promise Zones Job Creation Act of 2014, H.R. 4941, 113th Cong. (2014), which would have
amended the Tax Code to provide such benefits, never passed. H.R. 4941 (113th): Promise Zone Job
Creation Act of 2014, GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr4941
[ https://perma.cc/N78E-4UQ8 ] ( last visited Oct. 21, 2021 ).
124. Jesse Drucker & Eric Lipton, How a Trump Tax Break to Help Poor Communities Became
a Windfall for the Rich, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/31/
business/tax-opportunity-zones.html [ https://perma.cc/JA4N-G85N ].
125. See, e.g., Laura Sullivan & Meg Anderson, Affordable Housing Program Costs More, Shelters
Fewer, NPR (May 9, 2017, 12:31 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/05/09/527046451/affordablehousing-program-costs-more-shelters-less [ https://perma.cc/LFH4-LWAX ]. A 2018 report by the
Government Accountability Office covering the years 2011–2015 found that the LIHTC program
financed about 50,000 low-income rental units annually, with median costs per unit for new
construction ranging from $126,000 in Texas to $326,000 in California. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFF., GAO-18-637, LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT: IMPROVED DATA AND OVERSIGHT
WOULD STRENGTHEN COST ASSESSMENT AND FRAUD RISK MANAGEMENT (2018).
126. See Schlossberg, supra note 25, at 35–36 (“[E]nterprise zones have failed to produce the
desired effects of jobs for low income residents, increased capital investment, and physical revitalization
of the community.”); Burt S. Barnow, Job Creation for Low-Wage Workers: An Assessment of Public
Service Jobs, Tax Credits, and Empowerment Zones, in THE LOW-WAGE LABOR MARKET: CHALLENGES
AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR ECONOMIC SELF-SUFFICIENCY 101, 116 (Kelleen Kaye & Demetra Smith
Nightingale eds., 2000).
127. MARTIN D. ABRAVANEL, NANCY M. PINDUS, BRETT THEODOS, KASSIE BERTUMEN,
RACHEL BRASH & ZACH MCDADE, METRO. HOUS. & CMTYS. POL’Y CTR., NEW MARKETS TAX
CREDIT (NMTC) PROGRAM EVALUATION: FINAL REPORT, at vii (2013) (noting the program’s
“varying results” and stating that, as expected, as a “financing tool intended to encourage investment in
low-income communities, NMTC projects varied with respect to the kinds of outputs and outcomes
with which they were associated, the need for a public subsidy, and project viability”). One study found
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problematic given that the federal government has already spent sixty-one billion
dollars on the program.128
Although these programs have collectively saved developers and investors
billions of dollars, these federal investments have not created substantive
wealth-building impacts at the community level. While some of these programs have
ended, others have expanded and increased their budgets129 despite delivering
subpar or mediocre performance on their economic-development goals. The federal
government continues to sink funds into these modern Black-capitalist
economic-development programs while the wealth gap continues to grow for all
Americans.130 Furthermore, income and wealth disparities continue to be the largest
for Black, Native American, and Latinx people in the United States. Disparities in
individual and neighborhood income directly contribute to negative health
outcomes that decrease quality of life and cause higher mortality rates. Racial and
neighborhood-based health disparities are unconscionable at any time but can be
catastrophic during a pandemic. Therefore, it is imperative that the U.S. government
uses its policy and financial resources to effectively decrease the income and wealth
gap between low-income community members of color and white people in the
United States.
D. Public-Health Outcomes for Low-Income Communities
Residence in a low-income neighborhood has negative health implications.131
Living in a low-income community means greater exposure to environmental

that the NMTC subsidy had little, if any, impact on economic activity. Freedman, supra note 25. Any
modest benefits may have gone to new community members due to gentrification and potential
crowding out of long-term residents. Id. at 1009, 1012–13.
128. U.S. Treasury Awards $3.548 Billion in NMTC Allocations, KPMG ( July 16, 2020),
https://home.kpmg/us/en/home/insights/2020/07/tnf-us-treasury-awards-nmtc-allocations.html
[ https://perma.cc/7AQ4-WX3Y ].
129. See Sullivan & Anderson, supra note 125 (noting that the number of LIHTC units built
annually has decreased while the tax credits obtained and associated spending have increased); Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t Treasury, $3.5 Billion in New Markets Tax Credits Awarded to Spur Economic
Growth Nationwide (Feb. 13, 2018), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-release/sm0288
[ https://perma.cc/6NQQ-D66K ].
130. Ana Hernandez Kent, Lowell Ricketts & Ray Boshara, What Wealth Inequality in America
Looks Like: Key Facts & Figures, FED. RSRV. BANK ST. LOUIS (Aug. 14, 2019), https://
www.stlouisfed.org/open-vault/2019/august/wealth-inequality-in-america-facts-figures
[ https://
perma.cc/3WBT-YLAJ ] (“Wealth inequality in America has grown tremendously from 1989 to 2016,
to the point where the top 10% of families ranked by household wealth (with at least $1.2 million in
net worth) own 77% of the wealth ‘pie.’ The bottom half of families ranked by household wealth (with
$97,000 or less in net worth) own only 1% of the pie.”).
131. See Low-Income, ANXIETY & DEPRESSION ASS’N AM., https://adaa.org/low-incomecommunities [ https://perma.cc/P3B5-USH7 ] (Sept. 29, 2021) (“Low-income communities tend to
have specific characterizations such as limited resources, poor houses, high crime and violence rates,
and an inadequate school system, which are all associated with poor mental health outcomes.”); Ernie
Hood, Dwelling Disparities, 113 ENV’T HEALTH PERSPS. A 310, A 312–13 (2005) (“[I]t’s important to
examine the built environment in addition to individual risk factors when studying health disparities.”).
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burdens and less access to beneficial environmental features.132 Environmental
burdens like air, water, and soil pollution contribute to higher rates of asthma, lead
poisoning, and neurological disorders.133 Residents of high-poverty neighborhoods
have less access to parks, safe streets, recreation opportunities, and healthy foods.134
These differences contribute to cyclical, generational health disparities. Maternal
mortality and infant mortality rates are higher in low-income communities, and
average life expectancies are often lower than in similarly located high-income
census tracts.135 Therefore, it is imperative that the federal government creates a
community-development program that effectively decreases poverty and raises
neighborhoods’ economic standing.
People of color are disproportionately likely to be residents of low-income
communities in the United States.136 About 5% of white people in the United States
live in high poverty neighborhoods, whereas 26% of Black, 27% of Native
American, and 20% of Latinx people live in high-poverty neighborhoods.137 The
nationwide trend is also evident in OZs: people of color make up 39% of the
U.S. population but 57% of the Opportunity Zones population.138 Furthermore,

132. Mapping Life Expectancy, CTR. SOC’Y & HEALTH (Sept. 26, 2016),
https://societyhealth.vcu.edu/work/the-projects/mapping-life-expectancy.html [ https://perma.cc/
4G2E-ZU8B ].
133. Id.; DAVID AZOULAY, PRISCILLA VILLA, YVETTE ARELLANO, MIRIAM GORDON, DOUN
MOON, KATHRYN MILLER & KRISTEN THOMPSON, PLASTIC & HEALTH: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF A
PLASTIC PLANET 45 (Amanda Kistler ed. 2019), https://ipen.org/sites/default/files/documents/
plastic-and-health-the-hidden-costs-of-a-plastic-planet-february-2019.pdf [ https://perma.cc/LEG5ECG7 ] (“It is estimated that in 2015, [incinerator-linked] airborne particulates caused the premature
deaths of over four million people worldwide.”); Robert D. Bullard, Race and Environmental Justice in
the United States, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 319, 319 (1993); Zoë Schlanger, Race is the Biggest Indicator in the
US of Whether You Live Near Toxic Waste, QUARTZ (Mar. 22, 2017), https://qz.com/939612/race-isthe-biggest-indicator-in-the-us-of-whether-you-live-near-toxic-waste/ [ https://perma.cc/8Q3V-6KKN ].
134. Neighborhood Poverty: All Neighborhoods Should Be Communities of Opportunity., NAT’L
EQUITY ATLAS, https://nationalequityatlas.org/indicators/Neighborhood_poverty#/ [ https://
perma.cc/8XWY-2LCN ] ( last visited Oct. 21, 2021 ).
135. Mapping Life Expectancy, supra note 132 (“In some cases, life expectancy can differ by as
much as 20 years in neighborhoods only about five miles apart from one another.”); Dan Kopf
& Daniel Wolfe, Map: What Story Does Your Neighborhood’s Life Expectancy Tell?, QUARTZ (Feb. 24,
2021),
https://qz.com/1462111/map-what-story-does-your-neighborhoods-life-expectancy-tell/
[ https://perma.cc/2XQW-U3P8 ] (describing neighboring census tracts that have a twenty-one-year
estimated life expectancy difference, where one census tract is high income and the other is
low income).
136. Neighborhood Poverty, supra note 134 (“People of color—particularly African Americans,
Latinos, and Native Americans—are significantly more likely than their White counterparts to live in
high-poverty neighborhoods, even if they themselves are not poor.”).
137. Id. A “high poverty” neighborhood has a poverty rate of twenty percent or more. WILL
MAHER, INST. FOR RSCH. ON POVERTY & MORGRIDGE CTR. FOR PUB. SERV., POVERTY FACT
SHEET: SUBURBAN POVERTY (2017–2018), https://www.irp.wisc.edu/wp/wp-content/uploads/
2018/05/FactSheet14-Suburban-Poverty.pdf [ https://perma.cc/AQ4J-WCLG ].
138. See Opportunity Zones: Facts & Figures, ECON. INNOVATION GROUP [ hereinafter Facts
& Figures ], https://eig.org/opportunityzones/facts-and-figures [ https://perma.cc/KN4S-HHWC ]
(Dec. 2020).
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Black people are the most overrepresented OZ residents: they make up 23% of OZ
residents but only 12% of the U.S. population.139
Racial bias exacerbates negative health outcomes for people of color living in
poor communities. People of color have significantly lower health outcomes than
white people in the United States.140 Health outcomes are worst for Black people,
who “have higher rates of diabetes, hypertension and heart disease than other
groups.”141 Black children have higher rates of obesity and higher instances of death
rates from asthma.142 Native Americans also experience lower quality health care,
higher mortality rates, and higher rates of suicide, drug and alcohol abuse,
depression, and sexual violence.143 The United States’ long-standing legacy of
racially motivated economic deprivation and its impact on the health of
communities of color necessitates federal intervention to improve the lives and
health outcomes for all people in the United States.
II. THE OPPORTUNITY ZONE PROGRAM
A. The Law
The Economic Innovation Group, a think tank founded by Facebook’s first
president, Sean Parker, outlined a policy to create a tax incentive to promote
economic development in low-income communities in 2015.144 The Investing in
Opportunity Act, sponsored by Senators Tim Scott (R-SC) and Cory Booker
(D-NJ) and Representatives Pat Tiberi (R-OH) and Ron Kind (D-WI), created the
139. Id.
140. AM. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS, RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE 3
(2010) (“Racial and ethnic minorities tend to receive poorer quality care compared with nonminorities,
even when access-related factors, such as insurance status and income, are controlled.”).
141. Risa Lavizzo-Mourey & David Williams, Being Black Is Bad for Your Health, U.S. NEWS
(Apr. 14, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/policy-dose/articles/2016-0414/theres-a-huge-health-equity-gap-between-whites-and-minorities [ https://web.archive.org/web/
20210703032238/https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/policy-dose/articles/2016-04-14/theresa-huge-health-equity-gap-between-whites-and-minorities ].
142. Id. (“Black children have a 500 percent higher death rate from asthma compared to
white children.”).
143. Findling et al., supra note 32, at 1432, 1434.
144. See JARED BERNSTEIN & KEVIN A. HASSETT, ECON. INNOVATION GRP., UNLOCKING
PRIVATE CAPITAL TO FACILITATE ECONOMIC GROWTH IN DISTRESSED AREAS (2015). This paper
argues that the federal government can remedy the geographically uneven economic recovery after the
Great Recession by creating special incentives for private investors. Id. at 1. The authors state that the
previous iterations of similar geographically-based economic development policies—Empowerment
Zones, Enterprise Communities, Renewal Communities, and New Market Tax Credit—failed or had
mixed results because they were too complex, failed to effectively target the increased employment and
investment goals, too severely limited the size of investments that could qualify, did not pair easily with
other federal programs, and did not effectively incentivize collaboration with other institutional
investors like banks, private equity, and venture funds. Id. at 11–15. The authors then propose that the
pitfalls of the prior programs could be avoided by focusing on incentivizing the deployment of capital
gains in designated geographic regions and by enabling investors to pool funds into a venture capital,
firm-like structure that would allow invested money to “easily sit on the sidelines for longer periods as
the funds seek profitable investment opportunities.” Id. at 16–17.
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legal framework for the proposal. The bill’s sponsors championed its ability to
support entrepreneurs and small businesses “to grow, innovate and create jobs.”145
The OZ program was signed into law as part of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of
2017.146 President Trump discussed the policy’s power to bring hope and
revitalization to diverse, economically distressed communities across the country.147
Progressive and conservative lawmakers and administrators heralded this
legislation’s ability to create substantive change for working people and people of
color in poor communities.148 Governors across the country spoke about the
policy’s ability to revitalize communities in their states.149 Business leaders and
policy advocates discussed the policy’s power to harness wealth in support of
economic revitalization.150
The policy empowered governors to nominate twenty-five percent of their
state’s “low income”151 census tracts to become OZs by March 21, 2018.152 Up to

145. Press Release, Tim Scott, supra note 29.
146. I.R.C. §§ 1400Z-1 to -2.
147. Remarks by President Trump at Signing of an Executive Order Establishing the White House
Opportunity and Revitalization Council, TRUMP WHITE HOUSE (Dec. 12, 2018, 2:37 PM) [ hereinafter
Remarks ],
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trumpsigning-executive-order-establishing-white-house-opportunity-revitalization-council/ [ https://perma.cc/
DD62-V2MU ] (“With Opportunity Zones, we are drawing investment into neglected and underserved
communities of America so that all Americans, regardless of zip code, have access to the
American Dream.”).
148. See, e.g., The Promise of Opportunity Zones: Hearing Before the J. Econ. Comm., supra note 28
(statement of Sen. Martin Heinrich, Ranking Member, J. Econ. Comm.) (“They can support
investments in affordable housing and small businesses while spurring job creation, and they can help
lift living standards in neighborhoods across the country.”); Remarks, supra note 147 (reporting
Secretary Ben Carson saying, “By offering incentives that encourage investors to think in terms of
decades instead of days, Opportunity Zones ensure that development is here today and here to stay.
This long-term approach means that new growth becomes consistent growth and new jobs become
steady job”).
149. Facts & Figures, supra note 138 (quoting Governor Phil Murphy saying, “[T]he
Opportunity Zone Program will be a vital resource in stimulating long-term economic growth and
investment in cities and towns that need it most, and more importantly, in generating economic
opportunities for our residents”).
150. See Remarks, supra note 147 (quoting co-founder of the television network BET, Bob
Johnson, saying, “And I am convinced that this program, where the tax incentives flowing out of the
Treasury Department to business people, will cause people to invest money where before they saw risk,
now they will see opportunity. And that combination of putting money into communities will allow for
those communities to become vibrant, to become safe, to create ownership, and, most important, to
contribute to the wellbeing of this country. . . . I’m a fundamental believer that there are business
solutions to social problems. The Opportunity Zone program is that.”).
151. As defined in I.R.C. § 45D(e). Under this section, a census tract is a “low-income
community” if either (A) “the poverty rate for such tract is at least 20 percent” or (B) “in the case of a
tract not located within a metropolitan area, the median family income for such tract does not exceed 80
percent of statewide median family income” or “in the case of a tract located within a metropolitan
area, the median family income for such tract does not exceed 80 percent of the greater of statewide
median family income or the metropolitan area median family income.” Id.
152. § 1400Z-1; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury, IRS Announce First
Round of Opportunity Zones Designations for 18 States (Apr. 9, 2018), https://home.treasury.gov/
news/press-releases/sm0341 [ https://perma.cc/8DB2-V78P ].
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five percent of a state’s OZs were allowed to be higher income153 so long as they
were contiguous with a qualifying low-income census tract.154
The tax benefit is threefold. First, investors are able to defer paying taxes on
their capital gains if they invest them in Qualified Opportunity Funds (OZ
funds).155 The tax must be paid by December 31, 2026, or when the investment is
sold, whichever is first.156 Second, if the original investment in the OZ fund is held
for at least five years, the investor will be able to exclude ten percent of the original
gain from taxation.157 If the original investment is held for at least seven years, the
investor can exclude fifteen percent of the original gain from taxation.158 Third, if
the investment is held in an OZ fund for ten years, any new capital-income gains
from the sale or exchange of that investment in the OZ fund are permanently
excluded from taxation.159
There are minimal requirements for OZ fund investments to qualify for the
tax benefit. To receive the tax benefit, an OZ fund must have ninety percent of its
assets in “qualified opportunity zone property,” which includes “qualified
opportunity zone stock, [ ] qualified opportunity zone partnership interest, or [ ]
qualified opportunity zone business property.”160 The law prohibits claiming the tax
benefit for investments in certain “sin businesses”161 including golf courses, country
clubs, casinos, liquor stores, and tanning salons.162 The law also prohibits OZ funds
from obtaining benefits for land investments, unless the fund then makes
substantial developments on the land, to avoid incentivizing land speculation.163 To
prevent OZ funds from simply moving an already existing business from outside
an OZ to inside an OZ (which would defeat the goal of increasing capital

153. Up to five percent of designated OZs may be non-low-income census tracts, so long as
they are contiguous with low-income OZs and the median family income of the non-low-income tract
does not exceed 125% of the median family income of that contiguous low-income community
qualified OZ. I.R.C. § 1400Z-1(e).
154. Id.
155. § 1400Z-2(a)(1).
156. § 1400Z-2(b).
157. § 1400Z-2(b)(2)(B)(iii).
158. § 1400Z-2(b)(2)(B)(iv).
159. § 1400Z-2(c).
160. § 1400Z-2(d)(2)(A).
161. Investing in Qualified Opportunity Funds, 85 Fed. Reg. 1866, 1896 ( Jan. 13, 2020).
162. § 1400Z-2(d)(3)(A)(iii) (citing § 144(c)(6)(B)); § 144(c)(6)(B) (“[N]o portion of the
proceeds of such issue is to be used to provide (including the provision of land for) any private or
commercial golf course, country club, massage parlor, hot tub facility, suntan facility, racetrack, or other
facility used for gambling, or any store the principal business of which is the sale of alcoholic beverages
for consumption off premises.”).
163. Investing in Qualified Opportunity Funds, 85 Fed. Reg. at 1916; see also SEAN LOWRY
& DONALD J. MARPLES, CONG. RSCH. SERV., TAX INCENTIVES FOR OPPORTUNITY ZONES: IN
BRIEF 9 (2019) (citing Investing in Qualified Opportunity Zones, 84 Fed. Reg. 18,652, 18,654
(proposed May 1, 2019) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. Part 1)).
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investments), qualified OZ business properties must either have been “originally
used” in the OZ or the OZ fund must “substantially improve” the property.164
B. The Impact: Black Capitalism Repackaged for 2017
OZ proponents say the policy addresses “widening geographic disparities and
increasingly uneven economic growth” by spurring long-term private-sector
investments in American communities that have been “left behind.”165 Three years
after the OZ program was signed into law, President Trump and other elected
officials touted the success of the OZ program.166 President Trump highlighted this
program as part of his racial-equity policy.167 Some elected officials have had more
measured responses to the program, including calling for increased reporting on the
expenditure and the projects it funds.168 Others have called for stricter requirements
on funded entities to ensure more jobs and affordable housing are generated.169
Ultimately, though, reforms will not be sufficient to make this modern-day
Black-capitalism program meet its community-development and racial
wealth-building goals. At its core, the policy’s premise of market-based economic
development is insufficient to correct the history of legalized economic disparity in
the United States.
164. Investing in Qualified Opportunity Funds, 85 Fed. Reg. at 1908–09; see also LOWRY
& MARPLES, supra note 163, at 9 (“[T]he proposed rule encourages investments in new tangible
property, as opposed to property that a business might have used elsewhere and then moved to business
operations within an OZ.”).
165.
Press Release, Tim Scott, supra note 29; see also History of Opportunity Zones,
ECON. INNOVATION GRP., https://eig.org/opportunityzones/history [ https://perma.cc/5P3H4BCQ ] ( last visited Oct. 22, 2021 ).
166. David Jeans, “It’s All Working”: Trump Lauds Opportunity Zones During State of the Union,
REAL DEAL (Feb. 5, 2020, 9:38 AM), https://therealdeal.com/2020/02/05/its-all-working-trumplauds-opportunity-zones-during-state-of-the-union/ [ https://perma.cc/DB9B-ZRW9 ].
167. See Donald Trump & Joe Biden Final Presidential Debate Transcript 2020, REV (Oct. 22,
2020),
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-joe-biden-final-presidential-debatetranscript-2020 [ https://perma.cc/NK8K-7YXK ]. In response to a question about the dangers Black
and brown people of color face when interacting with the police, Trump responded by discussing his
policies, including OZs. Id. He stated “[OZs are] one of the most successful programs. People don’t
talk about it. Tremendous investment is being made, biggest beneficiary, the black and
Hispanic communities.” Id.
168. See, e.g., Press Release, Cory Booker, U.S. Sen. for N.J., Booker, Scott, Hassan, Young
Introduce Bipartisan Bill to Strengthen Reporting Requirements for Opportunity Zone Tax Incentive
(May 8, 2019), https://www.booker.senate.gov/news/press/booker-scott-hassan-young-introducebipartisan-bill-to-strengthen-reporting-requirements-for-opportunity-zone-tax-incentive
[ https://
perma.cc/8ZWZ-76ES ].
169. See, e.g., Oscar Perry Abello, Boulder Presses Pause on Some Opportunity Zone Development,
NEXT CITY (Mar. 6, 2019), https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/boulder-presses-pause-on-someopportunity-zone-development [ https://perma.cc/G5MK-SVAT ] (describing the city moratorium on
building permits in the city’s OZ if the proposals do not meet affordability requirements); Emilie
Raguso, Council May Require Developers to Build Low-Income Units in ‘Opportunity Zones,’
BERKELEYSIDE (Apr. 13, 2020, 4:55 PM), https://www.berkeleyside.com/2020/04/13/city-councilmay-start-requiring-affordable-units-in-parts-of-berkeley [ https://perma.cc/L6DP-LNBL ] (describing
a Berkeley City Council proposal that would require developers to build affordable units in construction
projects in any of the city’s qualified OZs).
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A tax that redistributes wealth to improve overall social welfare is generally
seen as a positive program by tax law scholars,170 lawmakers,171 and
businesspeople,172 yet the OZ program is just another iteration of Black-capitalism
policy, aimed at quelling the concerns of poor people of color without actually
working toward equitable community development.
Despite the increased capital flowing into certain OZs, the program will not
empower, enrich, or bring equity to the long-term, low-income residents of those
communities.173 The three main issues with the OZ program are that it fails to focus
on job-creating investments, ignores the United States’ history of inequitable growth
and access to capital, and will provide windfalls to investors rather than substantially
changing investor behavior.
1. Missed Opportunity to Create Good Jobs
One of the goals of the OZ tax program is to create jobs in OZs.174 Policy
advocates say it will “seed new startups, accelerate business expansions, [and] create
jobs.”175 The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) states that OZs “are designed to spur
economic development and job creation in distressed communities.”176 President
Trump claimed that the program has created tens of thousands of jobs.177 Senator
Tim Scott, the policy’s main sponsor, announced that 1,500 permanent jobs will
come to South Carolina through an OZ project.178 Yet these success stories gloss
170. Sarah B. Lawsky, On the Edge: Declining Marginal Utility and Tax Policy, 95
MINN. L. REV. 904, 910 (2011).
171. See, e.g., 164 CONG. REC. S618 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 2018) (statement of Sen. Mitch McConnell)
(“[The OZ program] will help deliver targeted relief to communities that need it the most.”).
172. See Sophie Quinton, Luxury Apartments Get the Tax Breaks Meant to Boost Low-Income
Areas, PEW TRS. (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/
blogs/stateline/2019/09/25/luxury-apartments-get-the-tax-breaks-meant-to-boost-low-income-areas
[ https://perma.cc/JV2X-F5AS ] (quoting Kevin Shields, chairman and CEO of alternative investment
asset management company Griffin Capital Company, stating, “The tax break will generate significant
wealth for investors while driving money into communities”).
173. I.R.C. § 1400Z-2; see also Drucker & Lipton, supra note 124 (“[B]illions of untaxed
investment profits are beginning to pour into high-end apartment buildings and hotels, storage facilities
that employ only a handful of workers, and student housing in bustling college towns, among
other projects.”).
174. See WHITE HOUSE OPPORTUNITY & REVITALIZATION COUNCIL, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT 7 (2019) [ hereinafter WHITE HOUSE ORC REPORT ], https://www.ncsha.org/wpcontent/uploads/OZ_One_Year_Report_2019.pdf [ https://perma.cc/2H44-VPKQ ].
175. Facts & Figures, supra note 138.
176. Opportunity Zones Frequently Asked Questions, IRS [ hereinafter FAQ ], https://
www.irs.gov/credits-deductions/opportunity-zones-frequently-asked-questions
[ https://perma.cc/LCM9-9KEC ] ( last visited Dec. 15, 2020 ).
177. See Laura Strickler & Blayne Alexander, Trump Is Touting Opportunity Zones as a Huge
Success with No Proof, NBC NEWS (Sept. 26, 2020, 5:47 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/
economy/trump-touting-opportunity-zones-huge-success-no-proof-n1231546 [ https://perma.cc/3E
4P-TBJA ]. Part of the reason Trump’s statements are problematic is that the law’s lack of reporting
requirements makes it harder to fact-check his claims.
178. Press Release, Tim Scott, U.S. Sen. for S.C., Huge Opportunity Zone Announcement,
1,500 Permanent Jobs Coming to South Carolina (Sept. 2, 2020), https://www.scott.senate.gov/media-
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over a fundamental issue of the program: there is no requirement that Qualified
Opportunity Funds invest in projects or activities that create jobs.179
The infusion of development money alone is insufficient to ensure that any
new jobs will be created,180 let alone the kinds of jobs that would support larger
community-wealth development. This Section examines how community
investments can create jobs that strengthen local economies by enabling more
people to enter the workforce and get “good jobs.”181
Within the U.S. labor market, some workers are treated as more valuable than
others.182 Though the COVID-19 pandemic has generated the term “essential
worker,”183 these laborers work in some of the lowest paid positions.184 Many
essential workers are employed in low-wage industries such as the meatpacking,

center/press-releases/huge-opportunity-zone-announcement-1500-permanent-jobs-coming-to-southcarolina [ https://perma.cc/ZU3K-6B9V ].
179. LOWRY & MARPLES, supra note 163, at 9. Congress has designed other place-based
economic-development tax expenditures to ensure the return on investment in the form of job creation.
180. See SPENCER M. COWAN, WOODSTOCK INST., PATTERNS OF DISPARITY: SMALL
BUSINESS LENDING IN THE CHICAGO AND LOS ANGELES-SAN DIEGO REGIONS, at i (2017),
https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/5028189/Chicago-and-LASD-Report-CC-License-Update.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/W877-4VEW ].
181. Good jobs are defined as “stable, formal-sector employment that comes with core labor
protections such as safe working conditions, collective bargaining rights, and regulations against
arbitrary dismissal” that “enables at least a middle-class existence, by a region’s standards, with enough
income for housing, food, transportation, education, and other family expenses, as well as some saving.”
Dani Rodrik & Charles Sabel, Building a Good Jobs Economy 2–3 (Harvard Kennedy Sch., Working
Paper No. RWP20-001, 2019), https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
3612&context=faculty_scholarship [ https://perma.cc/6RLW-CEPJ ]. Another formulation is
provided by Chad Shearer and Isha Shah: good jobs pay or exceed median earnings for the local area
and provide health insurance. CHAD SHEARER & ISHA SHAH, BROOKINGS METRO. POL’Y PROGRAM,
OPPORTUNITY INDUSTRIES: EXPLORING THE INDUSTRIES THAT CONCENTRATE GOOD AND
PROMISING JOBS IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA (2018), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2018/12/2018.12_BrookingsMetro_Opportunity-Industries_Report_Shearer-Shah.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/UJ2U-95VJ ].
182. See, e.g., Rodrik & Sabel, supra note 181 (describing a dualistic economy where “insiders”
have good jobs that provide a good quality of life and “outsiders” have low-quality jobs with wages that
keep them on the margins of society).
183. Essential workers are employees of infrastructure, manufacturing, healthcare, telecoms,
defense, food and agriculture, transportation and logistics, energy, water, and law enforcement. The
Department of Homeland Security includes among its list of essential workers “businesses,
organizations, and government agencies whose functions are critical to public health, safety, and
economic and national security.” Adie Tomer & Joseph W. Kane, To Protect Frontline Workers During
and After COVID-19, We Must Define Who They Are, BROOKINGS METRO. POL’Y PROGRAM ( June
10, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/to-protect-frontline-workers-during-and-after-covid19-we-must-define-who-they-are/ [ https://perma.cc/T5Q7-4HH2 ].
184. Molly Kinder, Laura Stateler & Julia Du, The COVID-19 Hazard Continues, But the
Hazard Pay Does Not: Why America’s Essential Workers Need a Raise, BROOKINGS METRO. POL’Y
PROGRAM (Oct. 29, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-covid-19-hazard-continues-butthe-hazard-pay-does-not-why-americas-frontline-workers-need-a-raise/[ https://perma.cc/5BBD-Y6JW ].
While there are higher-paid essential workers, like public servants and healthcare workers, other
essential workers do not have the same financial safety net, workplace and union protections, and
healthcare access as their higher-wage counterparts.
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food-service, and grocery industries.185 These industries are part of a secondary
labor sector that “has few ladders to job advancement, little job stability, and more
gender and racial discrimination than the primary market.”186 In contrast to lowwage workers, people with “good jobs”187 make up the primary labor market where
workers are paid according to their value and promoted as that value increases.188
Although people in the primary and secondary labor markets live and exist alongside
each other,189 some communities in the United States have a higher proportion of
low-wage workers and relatively fewer higher earners.190 Shifting unemployed and
secondary labor sector members into the primary labor sector
is an effective way to increase community wealth and well-being in
lower-income communities.191
Unfortunately, almost half of the U.S. workforce are in low-skilled jobs in the
secondary labor market,192 and the proportion of low-wage or near-low-wage
workers is increasing, from thirty-six percent in the early 1990s to forty-four percent
in late 2019.193 Poor people are less likely to have the skills and education to qualify
185. Tomer & Kane, supra note 183.
186. Kaye & Smith Nightingale, Executive Summary of THE LOW-WAGE LABOR
MARKET: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR ECONOMIC SELF-SUFFICIENCY, supra note 126,
at ix.
187. See Rodrik & Sabel, supra note 181.
188. Kaye & Smith Nightingale, Executive Summary of THE LOW-WAGE LABOR
MARKET: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR ECONOMIC SELF-SUFFICIENCY, supra note 126,
at ix.
189. Rodrik & Sabel, supra note 181, (describing today’s dualistic labor markets as “islands of
productive, high-wage activities exist in a sea of poor jobs”).
190. See Martha Ross & Nicole Bateman, Low-Wage Work is More Pervasive Than You Think,
and There Aren’t Enough “Good Jobs” to Go Around, BROOKINGS (Nov. 21, 2019), https://
www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2019/11/21/low-wage-work-is-more-pervasive-than-you-think
-and-there-arent-enough-good-jobs-to-go-around/ [ https://perma.cc/A7FU-KXQA ] (noting that in
some towns, low-wage workers make up more than sixty percent of the workforce). Historically, labor
markets tended to be stronger in suburbs and rural areas than in central cities. See Kaye & Smith
Nightingale, Introduction and Overview to THE LOW-WAGE LABOR MARKET: CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES FOR ECONOMIC SELF-SUFFICIENCY, supra note 126, at 4 (noting trends from the late
1980s to late 1990s in job growth and opportunity showed a higher rate of development in suburbs and
that the recovery after the recession in the 1990s occurred more slowly in central cities than in suburbs
and rural areas).
191. Jerome M. Adams, Improving Individual and Community Health Through Better Employment
Opportunities, HEALTH AFFS. (May 8, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/
hblog20180507.274276/full/ [ https://perma.cc/K875-28QN ] (“In addition to providing personal
income, employment addresses broader societal needs: it helps accrue, through the collection of taxes,
resources for various community programs. This in turn reduces the need for social benefits, and helps
maintain social cohesion. Community revitalization due to an influx of well-employed and higher
earning residents can help make neighborhoods healthier, including through the creation of new
opportunities for physical activity and improved nutrition.”).
192. Ross & Bateman, supra note 190.
193. See Kaye & Smith Nightingale, Executive Summary of THE LOW-WAGE LABOR
MARKET: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR ECONOMIC SELF-SUFFICIENCY, supra note 126,
at ix (noting the rise from thirty-six to forty-one percent from 1990 to 2000). Ross and Bateman define
low-wage workers as people who earn two-thirds or less of the median wages for full-time/full-year
male workers, with wages adjusted for the cost of living across the country. MARTHA ROSS & NICOLE
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for high and moderately skilled jobs.194 Many members of the working poor are
thus employed in unskilled jobs.195 These jobs frequently pay wages that keep
full-time employees below the poverty line.196 Secondary sector jobs that
low-income people are most likely to obtain tend not to change an individual’s or
their family’s class or provide a financial safety net.197 Therefore, unless OZ projects
are designed with an emphasis on creating good jobs, the program runs the risk of
merely shifting people from being unemployed to becoming part of the
working poor.
The “trickle-down impacts” (larger impacts on communities and individuals
not directly employed by an economic-development project) are often limited,
so careful planning and consideration are needed to ensure that
community-development programs actually help poor communities.198 To reach
their full economic potential, government programs should pair any development
incentives with subsidies or other incentives for firms to provide medium-income
jobs.199 Businesses that create a substantial number of medium-income200 jobs
efficiently provide local welfare gains201 by enabling more people to enter the
workforce with fewer job changes by people who are already employed in the

BATEMAN, BROOKINGS METRO. POL’Y PROGRAM, MEET THE LOW-WAGE WORKFORCE 6–7 (2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/201911_Brookings-Metro_low-wageworkforce_Ross-Bateman.pdf#page=5 [ https://perma.cc/Z8A6-KGWX ].
194. See Kaye & Smith Nightingale, Executive Summary of THE LOW-WAGE LABOR
MARKET: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR ECONOMIC SELF-SUFFICIENCY, supra note 126,
at xi (stating that welfare recipients’ low skills and education lead to a concentration of job opportunities
in the secondary labor market); see also WHITE HOUSE ORC REPORT, supra note 174, at 7 (noting that
twenty-two percent of “adults living in Opportunity Zones have not attained a high school diploma,
compared to [thirteen] percent nationally”).
195. See Kaye & Smith Nightingale, Executive Summary of THE LOW-WAGE LABOR
MARKET: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR ECONOMIC SELF-SUFFICIENCY, supra note 126,
at xi.
196. See id. at 2 (noting that in 1997, twenty-nine percent of all workers and thirty-five percent
of female workers “had hourly wages that would be insufficient to lift a family of four out of poverty
even if they were to work full-year, full-time”); see also Anne L. Alstott, Work vs. Freedom: A Liberal
Challenge to Employment Subsidies, 108 YALE L.J. 967, 969 (1999) (“The vast majority of welfare
recipients will enter a labor market characterized by sub-poverty wages and little job security.”).
197. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
198. JOSEPH PERSKY, DANIEL FELSENSTEIN & VIRGINIA CARLSON, DOES TRICKLE DOWN
WORK?: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES AND JOB CHAINS IN LOCAL LABOR MARKETS
8–9 (2004).
199. Rodrik & Sabel, supra note 181 (suggesting tax easements or tailored public services as
potential incentives to encourage firms to create good jobs).
200. See PERSKY ET AL., supra note 198, at 44 tbl.3.4. The authors categorize jobs into five
groups based on income. Level one workers are the highest paid, and level five are the lowest paid.
Levels two, three, and four jobs are in the medium income range.
201. Relatedly, an alternative measurement of the impact of an economic-development project
is to measure the aggregate improvement of circumstances for all workers in a local vicinity. See Daniel
Felsenstein & Joseph Persky, Evaluating Local Job Creation, 73 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 23, 23 (2007)
(noting that this number would most accurately measure the “local welfare gain” created by an
economic-development project or program).

First to Printer_Raitz.docx (Do Not Delete)

2021]

11/16/21 7:28 AM

PUBLIC HEALTH AND RACIAL INEQUALITY

343

area.202 Impact-minded OZ investors will have the greatest likelihood of enhancing
local welfare by developing businesses that primarily employ mid-skilled workers.203
Driving investment in a particular community without a focus on creating
good jobs, particularly medium-income jobs, will have a marginal benefit at best.204
New investments, without an equity-focused policy guiding the application of that
money, will not help create good jobs in OZs.205 A local economy will continue to
struggle if workers do not have the opportunity to get more economic security
through their employment.206 Unfortunately, the OZ program’s lack of focus on
creating substantial numbers of good jobs for moderately skilled workers means
that the program will fail to kick-start local economies.
2. Fails to Address the Legacy of Inequitable Growth and Access to Capital
Although OZ proponents argue that this program will help communities
become more financially vibrant, the program does nothing to address the history
of inequitable growth and access to capital that has hampered the economic mobility
of Black, Native American, and Latinx people in the United States.207 As Part I
described, the United States built the wealth of white people at the expense of and
through the marginalization of people of color for centuries. Policies focused on
equitable growth are necessary to ensure that subsidies actually help low-income
people.208 Equitable growth209 ensures that all community members can participate
202. See PERSKY ET AL., supra note 198, at 95–102 (comparing “trickle-down” impact efficiency
of two hypothetical firms: one creates manufacturing (primarily level three and four) jobs and the other
creates firm that creates management consultancy (level one) jobs and finding that the consulting firm
produced “skimpy welfare gains” for the hypothetical center city residents and less trickle-down impacts
than the manufacturing firm).
203. See id. at 8–9 (noting that even the manufacturing firm that created a substantial number
of mid-skilled jobs only had a modest trickle-down impact on the rest of the local economy).
204. See SAMANTHA JACOBY, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, POTENTIAL FLAWS OF
OPPORTUNITY ZONES LOOM, AS DO RISKS OF LARGE-SCALE TAX AVOIDANCE 4–5 (2019), https:/
/www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/1-11-19tax.pdf [ https://perma.cc/8YW9-3VGQ ];
see also PERSKY ET AL., supra note 198, at 6 (“The traditional approach to project evaluation, impact
analysis, usually counts jobs or payrolls without seriously considering the economic welfare
they generate.”).
205. See JACOBY, supra note 204, at 5; Tatiana Kimbo & Richard Phillips, How Opportunity Zones
Benefit Investors and Promote Displacement, INST. ON TAX’N & ECON. POL’Y (Aug. 10, 2018), https://
itep.org/how-opportunity-zones-benefit-investors-and-promote-displacement/ [ https://perma.cc/
3PEL-8RMF ].
206. See JACOBY, supra note 204, at 4.
207. NANCY O. ANDREWS, RACE, GENDER, AND EQUITY IN COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
12 (2019) (“Economics alone cannot alleviate poverty, unless it is bent in the direction of fairness and
justice. Economic opportunity alone will fall short of creating fairness unless fairness is an explicit
component in the first place. . . . Without a broader aperture to our vision, without a more inclusive
theory of change that goes beyond economics and trickle-down assumptions, we will not achieve
our mission.”).
208. CHRIS SCHILDT, KEY STRATEGIES TO ADVANCE EQUITABLE GROWTH IN REGIONS
6 (2015).
209. Others have articulated this notion as “equitable development.” See BRETT THEODOS,
ERIC HANGEN, JORGE GONZÁLEZ & BRADY MEIXELL, URB. INST., AN EARLY ASSESSMENT OF
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in generating new jobs and businesses while sharing the economic-development
benefits.210 Equitable growth requires regional planning input from city agencies,
nonprofits, grassroots advocates, and the business sector.211 These
various stakeholders should work together to create and implement an
economic-development plan.212
Yet the OZ program failed to engage most of these key players in its design.
While governors selected the OZs for each state, the program creates no
development strategy and instead leaves individual OZ funds with the decisions
about where and how to invest. Investors who are primarily focused on the
profitability of their OZ projects will not likely focus on equitable growth.213 Like
its Black-capitalism policy predecessors that also relied on businesses to make
altruistic or profit-driven investments as a means of reducing segregation and
racialized poverty,214 the OZ program will fail because it relies on the private sector
to correct centuries of disinvestment, neglect, and active marginalization of
communities of color.
The legacy of racist economic policies continues to impact low-income
communities, despite legal protections against race discrimination. People of color
in low-income communities often face multilayered discrimination when attempting
to obtain loans for businesses: geographic discrimination on the basis of the
enduring legacy of redlining and individual-based discrimination on the basis of
their race.215 The lack of access to bank loans causes Black and Latinx small-business
owners to have less capital on hand when they begin their businesses, which makes
them more vulnerable to market unpredictability.216 Additionally, this unequal
access to capital also makes ownership of smaller firms most feasible for Black and
Latinx people and reduces the wealth-building potential of business ownership.217

OPPORTUNITY ZONES FOR EQUITABLE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS: NINE OBSERVATIONS ON THE
USE OF THE INCENTIVE TO DATE, at v (2020), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/
publication/102348/early-assessment-of-opportunity-zones-for-equitable-development-projects.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RM8T-VMDQ] (describing equitable development as “blend[ing] economic
development and community development goals, and [seeking] to engage residents and local leaders in
decisionmaking [sic] about development in their communities”).
210. SCHILDT, supra note 208, at 6.
211. Id. at 6–7.
212. Id.
213. See infra Section II.B.3.
214. See generally BARADARAN, supra note 35.
215. Daniel Immergluck, Intrametropolitan Patterns of Small-Business Lending: What Do the New
Community Reinvestment Act Data Reveal? 34 URB. AFFS. REV. 787, 787 (2013) (“Discrimination and
redlining in business lending have been cited as contributing to economic decline in lower-income
neighborhoods.”); see also Mehrsa Baradaran, How the Poor Got Cut Out of Banking, 62 EMORY
L.J. 483, 494 (2013) (discussing the role of discrimination and redlining in limiting poor people’s access
to banks).
216. See, e.g., MARLENE OROZCO & ILIANA PEREZ, STANFORD GRADUATE SCH. OF
BUS., STATE OF LATINO ENTREPRENEURSHIP 19–25 (2018).
217. K. STEVEN BROWN, MARCELA MONTES & HANNAH HASSANI, URB. INST., STATE AND
LOCAL APPROACHES TO THE CHICAGO REGION’S RACIAL AND ETHNIC WEALTH INEQUITY 4
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While OZ proponents said local entrepreneurs in OZs would benefit from
increased access to capital, this has not born out.218 Studies on program investments
so far reveal that investors are less inclined to invest in operating businesses because
they are generally less profitable than other investments and the maximum tax
benefit is achieved after ten years in the investment.219 Investors seeking to
maximize the OZ tax benefit look for investments that will be easily exited in ten
years.220 This rigid exit timeline is counter to typical venture capital investment
strategies that look for the right time and opportunity to sell the business.221
Furthermore, the transaction costs make it difficult to invest in start-up and small
businesses. As one investor put it, “How can we figure out a way where you get
your equity back whether it’s through equity repurchase [or] bringing in other
partners to the deal. That’s not an easy thing to solve for.”222 Additionally, small
businesses typically do not generate the kind of growth that would attract
equity investors.223
Relatedly, the OZ program also has the impact of siphoning federal resources
from low-income census tracts that were not designated as OZs. The federal
government suggests that potential investors “stack” the benefits of several federal
tax incentives to make a project in an OZ more profitable than in another area.224
To that end, members of Congress encourage governors to consider the availability
and location of other economic-development activities as they considered which
census tracts to nominate as OZs.225 While “stacking” benefits can make projects
in OZs more feasible, it concentrates government subsidies in certain communities
at the expense of others.226 In fact, non-designated low-income locations are likely
to lose out on federally subsidized investments because the OZ program lures
investments elsewhere.227 The government has a responsibility to focus on equitable
development to ensure people of all races and communities prosper.
(2019), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/101423/state_and_local_approaches
_to_the_chicago_regions_racial_and_ethnic_wealth_inequity_1.pdf [ https://perma.cc/4JG5-VQYM ].
218. THEODOS ET AL., supra note 209, at vi (“[T]he most egregious failing of OZs to date is
that very little investment is going to small businesses, the exact group of investees that proponents had
held out as standing the most to benefit.”).
219. Id. at 26 (quoting an interviewee stating, “The more socially impactful the project, the
more the need for subsidy [beyond OZ incentives]”).
220. Id. at 22.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 23.
223. Id. at 22.
224. See LOWRY & MARPLES, supra note 162, at 11.
225. H.R. Rep. No. 115-466, at 538 (2017) (Conf. Rep.). The guidance encourages governors
to consider whether the locations are targets of other economic development incentives from state,
local, or private sources, as well as whether areas have “demonstrated success” with place-based
development programs including “promise zones, the new markets tax credit, empowerment zones,
and renewal communities.” Id.
226. Ofer Eldar & Chelsea Garber, Does Government Play Favorites? Evidence from
Opportunity Zones 10 (Oct. 3, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
227. See Kaye & Smith Nightingale, Introduction and Overview to THE LOW-WAGE LABOR
MARKET: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR ECONOMIC SELF-SUFFICIENCY, supra note 126,
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3. Investor Windfalls
The OZ program paradoxically seeks to make low-income communities
wealthier by making payments228 to high-income people who do not live in poor
communities.229 Specifically, the program uses a public subsidy (in the form of a tax
benefit) to incentivize businesses and real estate investments in communities where
such investments would not otherwise be made.230 Only people who have existing
unrealized capital gains are able to participate in the program, so the tax benefits
will be claimed by people who already have greater capital assets.231 While the
program has already benefitted taxpayers who invest in OZ funds,232 it is unclear
whether investor behavior is modified in a way that contributes to the program’s
development goals.
The OZ program has fewer statutory or regulatory mechanisms that promote
community development than previous place-based iterations of Black-capitalism
policy.233 For example, because the NMTC is capped, eligible projects compete for
limited funds.234 Projects are evaluated based on factors including “benefits to
low-income persons and jobs directly induced by the investments.”235 In
comparison, there is no cap on available OZ tax benefits, so they will accrue to any
eligible investment fund, regardless of the type of projects or potential
at 7 (“Tax credits paid to employers developing in economically distressed areas . . . [have the primary
effect of] relocat[ing] economic activity from near the zone to within it . . . .” (emphasis omitted)); see
also Alstott, supra note 195, at 1028.
228. See 2 U.S.C. § 622(3) (defining “tax expenditures,” for purposes of the Federal
Government’s budgetary process, as “those revenue losses attributable to provisions of the . . . tax laws
which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which provide a special
credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability”); Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition
Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 148 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Cash grants and targeted tax breaks are
means of accomplishing the same government objective—to provide financial support to select
individuals or organizations.”).
229. JACOBY, supra note 203.
230. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 115TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF PUBLIC
LAW 115-97 (Comm. Print 2018); see also The Promise of Opportunity Zones: Hearing Before the
J. Econ. Comm., supra note 28 (statement of Rep. Erik Paulson, Chairman, J. Econ. Comm.) (quoting
John Lettieri, President of the Economic Innovation Group, saying, “[OZs] will bring ‘the best possible
mix of investments in new and expanding businesses, infrastructure and energy projects, commercial
real estate, affordable housing and more.’ Opportunity Zones also hold the promise of local knowledge
and engagement. They are chosen by governors, who know their communities well, and not by Federal
planners with a formula-based spreadsheet”).
231. Rebecca Lester, Cody Evans & Hanna Tian, Opportunity Zones: An Analysis of the Policy’s
Implications, 90 STATE TAX NOTES 221, 228 (2018).
232. Taxpayers immediately benefit by deferring taxes on capital gains when those gains are
invested in Qualified Opportunity Funds. This is the first tax benefit provided by the program, and
the most easily measurable at this stage in the program’s life. As of March 5, 2020, a total of 233
Qualified Opportunity Funds have registered with the I.R.S., which will invest an anticipated $48.1
billion in OZs. Opportunity Zone Fund Directory, NAT’L COUNCIL OF STATE HOUS. AGENCIEs,
https://www.ncsha.org/resource/opportunity-zone-fund-directory/ [ https://perma.cc/B9WC-6J9D ]
(July 28, 2021).
233. See LOWRY & MARPLES, supra note 163, at 11–12.
234. Id. at 11.
235. Id.
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socioeconomic impact the OZ fund has.236 Also, unlike the NMTC, there is no
requirement for OZ funds to have a mission of serving low-income communities.237
Without social impact or job creation requirements to anchor OZ investments
in the policy’s community-development goals, many OZ investors are primarily
motivated by maximizing profits on their investments.238 Based on projections and
the available data about the types of investments generated by OZ funds,
investments into operating businesses, affordable housing, and infrastructure
development are less appealing investment options than other types of real
estate development.239
The lack of regulatory requirements allows investors to focus solely on return
on investment rather than on community development. Furthermore, the benefit is
structured to provide the largest financial benefits to the projects with the highest
returns.240 Early reporting on the program’s impacts show that significant OZ
funding is going to non-affordable real estate development instead of to impact
investors supporting projects with social missions.241 Therefore, dollar for dollar,
the public may be spending more on OZ-supported luxury housing than on
affordable housing projects.242
Furthermore, despite the OZ’s goal of supporting impoverished communities,
OZ funds are more likely to pay for housing projects in gentrifying neighborhoods
and college towns.243 Many OZ projects are going up in communities that would

236. Id. at 12.
237. Id.
238. THEODOS ET AL., supra note 209, at 19 (“When we’ve talked to Opportunity Zone
investors before about the transactions they want, the yields are something we can’t produce in
affordable housing, and the amount of developer fee they want for us is too small. Their expectations
are not realistic. You need to be an impact investor. A typical LIHTC investor gets maybe a 6 percent
IRR. These folks were asking for double digits. There’s no way to squeeze that out of a LIHTC deal.”).
An interviewee in the health field similarly shared, “I hear at conferences from investors about their
return expectations of 7 to 10 percent [pre-tax]. We can’t generate that kind of return.” Id. (alteration
in original).
239. Michael Novogradac, Novogradac Opportunity Funds List Surpasses $10 Billion in
Investment, NOVOGRADAC (Apr. 29, 2020, 12:00 AM), https://www.novoco.com/notes-fromnovogradac/novogradac-opportunity-funds-list-surpasses-10-billion-investment [ https://perma.cc/
DCS3-B4ZC ] (reporting $7.38 billion in residential and $6.12 billion in commercial real estate
investments and only $354.55 million in operating businesses and $307.12 million in renewables).
240. THEODOS ET AL., supra note 209, at 31. Since the tax benefit allows investors to not pay
taxes on capital gains from OZ projects if they are held in Qualified OZ funds for ten years or more,
investors have a financial incentive to maximize the capital gains flowing from each project. See FAQ,
supra note 176. Since most community-impact projects do not have high return on investment
compared to other types of development, the tax incentive structure undercuts the program’s
economic-impact goals.
241. THEODOS ET AL., supra note 209, at 31; see Drucker & Lipton, supra note 124 (noting that
in one congressional district containing OZs, the only OZ funded real estate project is for college
students, not poor community members).
242. THEODOS ET AL., supra note 209, at 31.
243. JOELLE SOSTHEIM & JORDAN BECK, A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY: AN OVERVIEW
AND ANALYSIS OF OPPORTUNITY ZONES 9 (2019) (“[W]e expect to see more commercial real estate
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have developed regardless of the subsidy.244 One study found that four percent of
qualified OZs have experienced recent socioeconomic change that indicates
significant community development.245 The designation of already developing
census tracts as OZs is most prevalent in popular coastal cities that are already
experiencing some of the worst gentrification in the country.246 One study noted
that OZs located in walkable urban places could be at risk of “unmanaged
gentrification and displacement.”247 Yet, these gentrifying OZs are the most
promising locations for return on investments.248 The OZ program could
potentially exacerbate gentrification trends in these communities because places
with increased investment risk are becoming too expensive for longtime residents
and businesses.249
A related issue is that OZ investments only need to be held for ten years to
receive the largest potential tax benefit.250 In fact, OZ investors will want to stay
invested for ten years to maximize the benefit and then exit the investment as soon
as possible after that.251 So, despite the program’s touted ability to bring “patient

investors concentrate capital in up-and-coming census tracts such as downtown areas, suburbs, or
college towns.”).
244. Drucker & Lipton, supra note 124. There are far fewer economic-development benefits
that arise from subsidizing projects that would have been created regardless of the benefit. See PERSKY
ET AL., supra note 198, at 12; Quinton, supra note 172.
245. See BRETT THEODOS, BRADY MEIXELL & CARL HEDMAN, URB. INST., DID STATES
MAXIMIZE THEIR OPPORTUNITY ZONE SELECTIONS? 6–7 (2018), https://www.urban.org/sites/
default/files/publication/98445/did_states_maximize_their_opportunity_zone_selections_1.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/75FU-LSCK ] (noting that nationally, 3.7% of designated OZs have experienced
socioeconomic change indicative of gentrification before the OZ legislation. Sixteen states have
disproportionately higher percentages of OZs that are gentrifying, with New York having the highest
at thirteen percent); see also Kathryn Tokle, Opportunity Zones’ Biggest Myths, FORBES (May 29, 2019,
10:11
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/sorensonimpact/2019/05/29/opportunity-zonesbiggest-myths/#17d95cdb1d4e [ https://perma.cc/WUX3-7FXQ ] (implying that the low- and middleincome residents in the four percent gentrifying OZs are at risk of displacement).
246. THEODOS ET AL., supra note 245, at 6 (“Washington, DC . . . has a much higher share of
tracts that have undergone such changes, at 32 percent. . . . [This rate is similar to] cities such as New
York City at 21 percent, Oakland at 37 percent, and Seattle at 40 percent.”).
247. See CHRISTOPHER A. COES & TRACY HADDEN LOH, NATIONAL OPPORTUNITY ZONES
RANKING
REPORT
13
(2018),
https://smartgrowthamerica.org/app/uploads/2018/12/
LOCUS_opportunity-zones-FINAL.pdf [ https://perma.cc/6X6K-97TW ].
248. Id. at 9 (ranking OZs in New York as the best market for all product types, including
office, multifamily housing, and retail rental spaces).
249. See BEN BARTLETT, CREATION OF A MUNICIPAL QUALIFIED OPPORTUNITY FUND TO
INVEST IN BERKELEY’S QUALIFIED OPPORTUNITY ZONES 2 (2019) (“[T]here is a risk that housing
prices will rise, driving out the existing low-income residents and people of color in Berkeley.
Furthermore, locally-owned small businesses could face increased competition from large franchises
and may also be unable to meet rising rental costs from the developing Qualified Opportunity Zones.”).
250. I.R.C. § 1400Z-2; see also Harold R. Berk, Suggested Statutory Changes to Opportunity Zone
Incentive, J. PASSTHROUGH ENTITIES, Nov.–Dec. 2019, at 67, 68 (“The largest potential OZ tax benefit
is the provision allowing a complete exclusion of gain taxation on any appreciated value on sale of the
OZ investment if it is held for at least 10 years.”).
251. THEODOS ET AL., supra note 209, at 22.
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capital”252 to communities, most OZ investors will be involved in communities for
only ten years. Proponents of this flexibility argue it is necessary to maximize
program participation.253 Yet, it is unclear that maximizing investments without
social-impact goals will improve OZ residents’ lives.
While the general lack of investment oversight and restrictions at the federal
level creates incentives to develop projects more focused on profit than community
development, the upside is that the policy gives state and local leaders the reigns for
designating OZs and regulating OZ projects. City leaders asked their governors to
designate OZs that aligned with the cities’ long-term planning goals.254 This is one
of the policy’s upsides: local governments can ensure the OZ-funded projects in
their jurisdictions meet criteria and serve the needs of the local populations.255 In
fact, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development recommends
jurisdiction-specific policies to enable communities to ensure that local OZs see
beneficial, equitable development.256 The federal government’s support for local
control over OZs gives decision makers freedom to use the program to shape
community development as best they see fit. While this regulatory tool is limited to
OZs where local leaders affirmatively act, it is nonetheless beneficial that the federal
government allows local jurisdictions to define which OZ developments they
will authorize.
If the program’s objective is purely to maximize investments into OZs, this
program’s lax restrictions will enable it to work effectively. However, if the objective
of the program is to raise social welfare in OZ communities or provide more job
opportunities in those communities, the program as structured will not be effective

252. ECON. INNOVATION GRP., OPPORTUNITY ZONES: A NEW INCENTIVE FOR INVESTING
LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES, https://eig.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/OpportunityZones-Fact-Sheet.pdf [ https://perma.cc/8WMP-2V77 ].
253. See, e.g., Investing in Qualified Opportunity Funds, 85 Fed. Reg. 1866, 1916 (Jan. 13, 2020)
(reasoning that “a bright-line standard would be inappropriately restrictive because the determination
of whether such land would qualify as qualified OZ business property would require consideration of
all relevant facts and circumstances” in describing why “substantial development” was not defined as
it related to vacant land purchases for qualified OZ fund investments).
254. See, e.g., Solomon Greene, Brady Meixell & Ruth Gourevitch, Opportunity Zoning: An
Inside Look at How Three Cities Are Aligning a New Tax Incentive with Land-Use Plans to Revitalize
Neighborhoods, URB. INST. ( July 25, 2019), https://www.urban.org/features/opportunity-zoning
[https://perma.cc/873P-CB35] (describing how Fresno, California, Cleaveland, Ohio, and
Washington, DC incorporated land use planning at the local level into the requests for certain census
tracts to become OZs).
255. See id. (“[Washington, DC] is contributing public land and financing in these areas, which
can help ensure that new projects will provide job opportunities for local residents and businesses
through DC’s first source hiring and small business contracting requirements.”).
256. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URB. DEV., OPPORTUNITY ZONES TOOLKIT VOLUME 1: A
ROADMAP TO PLANNING FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WITHIN OPPORTUNITY ZONES
2
(2019), https://opportunityzones.hud.gov/sites/opportunityzones.hud.gov/files/documents/
Opportunity_Zones_Toolkit_Roadmap_FINAL_Edited_092319.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/KW6CKGDM ] (encouraging communities to adopt “policies and incentives that promote inclusive and
equitable economic growth for existing residents and businesses, expand access to opportunity, mitigate
displacement risks and incentivize investments focused on social benefits”).
IN
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even if it results in added investment. Ultimately, because of the program’s design
flaws, the primary beneficiaries of this policy will be wealthy investors.257
III. SUBSTANTIVE, NOT SYMBOLIC, SOLUTIONS
While public-private partnerships are appealing to voters across the political
spectrum, the federal government’s latest version of Black capitalism is not likely to
render results substantially different from its predecessors. Much like Nixon
effectively co-opted the Black power rhetoric to appeal to frustrated Black
community members and white middle-class voters,258 the OZ program seeks to
reassure low-income people of color that poverty relief, affordable housing, and
community well-being are on the way, while not offending the sensibilities of
middle-class voters who are against welfare and government handouts. Yet the
federal government created the economic disparities between Black, Native
American, and Latinx people and their white counterparts, so it is critical that the
federal government takes direct steps to correct these disparities. This is especially
true during the COVID-19 pandemic, when people’s jobs and economic privileges
are intimately tied with their ability to protect themselves and their families from
COVID-19 exposure.259
In order to effectively respond to the dire and growing need to address racial
wealth disparities, the federal government should raise incomes instead of trying to
align the motivations of private investors with community-development goals.
Community-development efforts should examine the ripple effects of reducing
poverty and increasing the spending power of low-income community members
through labor-focused—as opposed to investor-focused—expenditures. The
federal government already has a strong track record of alleviating poverty through
the labor-focused tax expenditure called the EITC.260 This program has proven
more effective at raising incomes and alleviating poverty than the NMTC, its
Black-capitalism contemporary.261 Building on the successes of the EITC, two other
257. I.R.C. § 1400Z-2; see also Drucker & Lipton, supra note 124.
258. See supra Section I.B.
259. Richard V. Reeves & Jonathan Rothwell, Class and COVID: How the Less Affluent Face
Double Risks, BROOKINGS (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/
03/27/class-and-covid-how-the-less-affluent-face-double-risks/ [ https://perma.cc/A2AN-QS2V ]
(“There are wide gaps by income class in both the risk posed by the virus, because of existing health
conditions, and in levels of response to the risk of infection.”).
260. See Barnow, supra note 126, at 113 (noting that the EITC program “plays a significant role
in reducing poverty”).
261. See id. at 33 (“An employee-based wage subsidy—such as the Earned Income Tax
Credit—is generally considered a more effective way to subsidize work.”). The NMTC program
reduced the number of people in poverty in an area by one for every $23,500 in subsidies, whereas the
EITC raised one person out of poverty for every $12,400 spent. Freedman, supra note 25, at 1009. This
cost comparison is only valid if people are actually raised out of poverty by the NMTC—if any of the
poverty reduction in the NMTC communities can be attributed to people in poverty moving out of the
designated NMTC areas, the cost of poverty reduction per person would be significantly higher. Id.
Nonetheless, even at the lowest possible estimate, the cost of poverty reduction using the NMTC is
almost double the cost of EITC.
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policies have the potential to substantively address the need for government
intervention in wealth inequality: universal basic income and reparations. This Part
details the structure of each and then describes the potential economic and health
benefits of adopting these policies.
A. Universal Basic Income
Universal basic income (UBI) is the concept of paying everyone in a
community a set sum of money at intervals, with no requirements for how the
money is spent.262 Philosophers and economists from across the political spectrum
have proposed UBI as a way to address poverty, joblessness, and economic
inequality.263 A UBI program would also support economic development because
higher incomes will increase economic activity.264
UBI is an effective economic-development tool because it directly alleviates
poverty. UBI recipients, especially those who are low-income, benefit from the
payments.265 In several studies, people with UBI were more likely to finish school
and attend training programs.266 People have used UBI payments to dig themselves
out of debt, pay for basic needs, and improve their employability.267 Populations
receiving UBI have experienced increased birth weight attributable to improved

262. Philippe Van Parijs, The Universal Basic Income: Why Utopian Thinking Matters, and How
Sociologists Can Contribute to It, 41 POL. & SOC’Y 171, 174 (2013).
263. See MELISSA S. KEARNEY & MAGNE MOGSTAD, UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME (UBI) AS A
POLICY RESPONSE TO CURRENT CHALLENGES 2 (2019), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2019/08/UBI-ESG-Memo-082319.pdf [ https://perma.cc/66RE-NZC8 ] (noting that
various elements of UBI proposals appeal to both conservative and liberal political thinkers).
Conservatives such as Milton Friedman and Charles Murray and progressives like Elizabeth Warren
and Andrew Yang support UBI policies. Id.; Amy Castro Baker & Stacia Martin-West, Can
Universal Basic Income Work?, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON ( Jan. 17, 2020), https://
knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/universal-basic-income/ [ https://perma.cc/4E83-FHG4 ]; see
also JULIANA BIDADANURE, SEAN KLINE, CAMILLE MOORE, BROOKS RAINWATER & CATHERINE
THOMAS, NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES & STANFORD BASIC INCOME LAB, BASIC INCOME IN CITIES: A
GUIDE TO CITY EXPERIMENTS AND PILOT PROJECTS 3 (2018), https://basicincome.stanford.edu/
uploads/BasicIncomeInCities_Report.pdf [ https://perma.cc/J5VB-LCKP ] (noting Thomas Paine’s
advocacy for a universal income in the 1700s).
264. MICHALIS NIKIFOROS, MARSHALL STEINBAUM & GENNARO ZEZZA, ROOSEVELT
INST., MODELING THE MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF A UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME 3 (2017),
https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/RI-Macroeconomic-Effects-of-UBI-20
1708.pdf [h ttps://perma.cc/232W-95K2 ] (finding that the gross domestic product would increase
with the implementation of UBI at various payment amounts); BIDADANURE ET AL., supra note 263,
at 4 (explaining Milton Friedman’s theory that reducing poverty through UBI could
support consumerism).
265. See, e.g., Alstott, supra note 196, at 971 (arguing for a program of “unconditional cash
grants” that would enable poorer people to “structure their working lives to meet personal and family
needs, to seek more education, or even choose where to live”).
266. Evelyn L. Forget, Reconsidering a Guaranteed Annual Income: Lessons from MINCOME,
PUB. SECTOR DIG., Fall 2015, at 18, 23 (“During [a UBI experiment], grade 12 enrollment in [the target
city] soared to the extent that in 1976 grade 12 enrollment exceeded 100%; previous dropouts were
returning to high school to graduate.”); BIDADANURE ET AL., supra note 263, at 8.
267. BIDADANURE ET AL., supra note 263, at 8.
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maternal nutrition.268 These outcomes lead to improved economic well-being and
physical and mental health.269 Increases in individual health can have ripple effects
that improve the well-being of whole neighborhoods.
Opponents of UBI argue that the payments will reduce people’s incentive to
work, thereby depriving the market of workers.270 However, there has been little
evidence from prior UBI programs to demonstrate that this is true.271 Another
critique is that people will spend their money unwisely,272 yet studies of programs
show that people more likely use the money to pay for necessities.273 Studies of UBI
programs have also demonstrated improved health outcomes for UBI recipients.274
The ongoing UBI programs in the United States have created substantial
benefits for recipients. In Alaska, the Permanent Fund Dividend grants each
Alaskan resident a share of the state’s mineral revenues.275 This has helped keep
between two and three percent of the state’s population from slipping into poverty
each year since 1990.276 The payments benefit children, rural residents, Alaska
natives, and those subject to economic instability the most.277 Alaskans report that
the payments improve their quality of life and provide an important source of
income.278 Casino revenues support UBI programs in some Native American
communities279 that have likewise created benefits including higher median

268. Barbara H. Kehrer & Charles M. Wolin, Impact of Income Maintenance on Low Birth
Weight: Evidence from the Gary Experiment, 14 J. HUM. RES. 434, 434 (1979) (reporting results from the
1970s Gary Income Maintenance Experiment).
269. David Calnitsky, “More Normal Than Welfare”: The Mincome Experiment, Stigma, and
Community Experience, 53 CANADIAN REV. SOCIO. 26 (2016); see also Forget, supra note 266, at 22.
270. Dylan Matthews, The 2 Most Popular Critiques of Basic Income Are Both Wrong, VOX ( July
20, 2017, 8:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/7/20/15821560/basic-incomecritiques-cost-work-negative-income-tax [ https://perma.cc/GY47-5MGD ].
271. Clifton B. Parker, Stanford Scholar Explores Pros, Cons of ‘Basic Income,’ STANFORD NEWS
(Aug. 8, 2018), https://news.stanford.edu/2018/08/08/stanford-scholar-explores-pros-cons-basicincome/ [ https://perma.cc/N9VG-C7NE ] (noting benefits of UBI, including that it can “underwrite
market participation,” as opposed to welfare programs that only assist people who do not have jobs,
thus creating perverse incentives for people to refrain from working so they can obtain the assistance).
272. BIDADANURE ET AL., supra note 263, at 8.
273. Id.
274. Evelyn L. Forget, New Questions, New Data, Old Interventions: The Health Effects of a
Guaranteed Annual Income, 57 PREVENTATIVE MED. 925, 925 (2013) (finding that families who
participated in a guaranteed annual income program in Manitoba were less likely to be hospitalized and
visited their doctors less for mental health issues).
275. About Us, ALASKA DEP’T OF REVENUE PERMANENT FUND DIVIDEND DIV., https://
pfd.alaska.gov/Division-Info/About-Us [ https://perma.cc/S85A-CAXE ] ( last visited Oct. 22, 2021 ).
276. MATTHEW BERMAN & RANDOM REAMEY, INST. OF SOC. & ECON. RSCH, PERMANENT
FUND DIVIDENDS AND POVERTY IN ALASKA (2016), https://iseralaska.org/static/
legacy_publication_links/2016_12-PFDandPoverty.pdf [ https://perma.cc/2ZAM-FGNW ].
277. BIDADANURE ET AL., supra note 263, at 11.
278. Id. (reporting views of eighty percent of one thousand Alaskan voters surveyed).
279. Aaron Diaz, The Impact of Indian Gaming on Educational Attainment, Poverty Among
Native American Tribes 18 (July 2009) (M.A. thesis, University of New Mexico), https://
digitalrepository.unm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1010&context=soc_etds [ https://perma.cc/
3ZX3-JTTW ].
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household incomes, increased employment, and decreased poverty.280 The positive
outcomes of these relatively small UBI programs suggest that the United States
would benefit from additional pilot programs to more thoroughly investigate
potential individual and community-wide benefits of UBI on the larger population.
B. Reparations
Reparations is the concept of paying for wrongs to apologize for, atone for,
and correct past harms.281 Reparations has been identified as a potential solution to
correct the harms done by the United States to members of racial minorities.282
After the Civil War, the federal government set out to enact a reparations policy to
correct wrongs against Black people.283 President Johnson abandoned the policy
after President Lincoln’s assassination, and the policy has not been seriously
considered since.284 Contemporary federal courts have held that the issue of
reparations to descendants of formerly enslaved people are political questions
constitutionally committed to the legislative and executive branches of the United
States.285 Despite the federal courts’ unwillingness to decide on legal claims to
reparations, the federal government has used reparations to apologize for the
internment of Japanese and Aleut U.S. citizens in World War II.286 This precedent
can be a framework for future government action to provide reparations to other
harmed communities. Given the United States’ history of genocide, internment,
colonization, violence, exploitation, and economic deprivation, it would be valuable
for the federal government to enact legislation to apologize for and correct the
harms it has done to various groups throughout the country’s history.287

280. Id. at v–vi.
281. See, e.g., Ediberto Roman, Reparations and the Colonial Dilemma: The Insurmountable
Hurdles and Yet Transformative Benefits, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 369, 369 (2002) (“[I]t is a request
of the dominant culture to atone for past wrongs, primarily through monetary relief.”).
282. See, e.g., Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. § 1989a(a) (awarding reparations to
individuals of Japanese ancestry who were interned during World War II); Cato v. United States, 70
F.3d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir. 1995) (seeking reparations as damages in complaint against the United States
due to enslavement of African people and subsequent discrimination against them and for
acknowledgement of continued discrimination and apology for wrongdoing); In re African-Am. Slave
Descendants Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (seeking monetary and injunctive relief against
corporations for present and past wrongs in connection with the institution of slavery); see also Eric
Y. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations: Japanese American Redress and African American Claims, 19
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 477, 481 n.16 (1998) (discussing a case brought by Native Hawaiian plaintiffs
“concerning claims against the United States for the overthrow of the Hawaiian government in 1893,
and the redress of breaches of the ceded lands trust committed by the United States and the State of
Hawai’i” (quoting Kealoha v. Hee, Civ. No. 94-0118-01 (1st Cir. 1994)).
283. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.
285. See In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d at 1075.
286. Restitution for World War II Internment of Japanese-Americans and Aleuts, 50
U.S.C.A. § 4215 (West 2021).
287. In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d at 1055 (citing In re Nazi Era
Cases Against German Defendants Litig., 129 F. Supp. 2d 370, 378 (D.N.J. 2001)).
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There is also the potential to create economic-development benefits through
the deployment of reparations.288 Reparations would help address lasting economic
disparities between harmed minority groups and the white population.289 The
marginalization and exploitation of people based on racial distinction is the
foundation of the United States’ wealth,290 and though U.S. leaders have made
efforts to apologize for the genocide of Native Americans and colonization of their
land291 and the enslavement of African Americans,292 they have failed to correct the
legacy of economic and health deprivation that these policies created. The adoption
of a reparations program would help correct this harm by paying people who
continue to be negatively impacted by the legacies of those policies.
For nearly thirty years, Representative John Conyers has introduced legislation
to study and develop a reparations policy for Black people in the United States.293
Despite these efforts, a study has not been conducted.294 Without such a study, only
general economic impact assumptions can be made. It is likely that reparations
programs structured similar to UBI programs would yield similar positive effects on
individual recipients.295 A reparations program, as opposed to a race-neutral
economic support program, would directly confront the history of violence and
economic repression that created the wealth gap, rather than avoiding that
history.296 Compared to a UBI program, reparations would more directly reduce the
income and wealth gap between Black, Native American, and certain other groups

288. Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, ATLANTIC (June 2014), https://
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631/
[ https://
perma.cc/9T33-JXD6 ]; Cyndi Suarez, How Black Reparations Differs from a New Economic Rights
Project, NONPROFIT Q. (Apr. 16, 2019), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/how-black-reparationsdiffers-from-a-new-economic-rights-project/ [ https://perma.cc/N73K-M96J ].
289. Christian Weller, Only Large Policy Interventions Such as Reparations Can Shrink the Racial
Wealth Gap, FORBES (Mar. 21, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/christianweller/2019/
03/21/only-large-policy-interventions-such-as-reparations-can-shrink-the-racial-wealth-gap/?sh=1e1
668991721 [ https://perma.cc/4LK9-CGR3 ].
290. Suarez, supra note 288 (noting that U.S. policies and practices that have stripped Black
Americans of capital have made white Americans richer “leading to the extreme income inequality we
have today”); Coates, supra note 288 (“America was built on the preferential treatment of white
people—395 years of it.”).
291. Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-118, 123
Stat. 3409 (2009).
292. S. Con. Res. 26, 111th Cong. (2009).
293. See, e.g., H.R. 40, 116th Cong. (2019); see also Sheila Jackson Lee, H.R. 40 Is Not a Symbolic
Act. It’s a Path to Restorative Justice, ACLU (May 22, 2020), https://www.aclu.org/news/racial-justice/
h-r-40-is-not-a-symbolic-act-its-a-path-to-restorative-justice/ [ https://perma.cc/QX5W-JKNH ].
294. Jackson Lee, supra note 293.
295. Michael Maiello, Why Reparations for Slavery Could Help Boost the Economy, REUTERS
( June 4, 2014, 2:31 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/idUS79547637320140604 [ https://
perma.cc/2FBX-YRWB ].
296. Coates, supra note 288 (arguing that race-neutral public policy of race “ignores the fact that
closing the ‘achievement gap’ will do nothing to close the ‘injury gap,’” in which Black people
continue to experience discrimination that makes it harder for them to get jobs, regardless of
educational background).
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of color and the rest of the general population.297 It would also send a symbolic
message of healing and deeper atonement, which likely could have positive
mental- and physical-health effects for recipients of the reparations and the
symbolic message they send.298 On the other hand, a reparations program would be
harder to administer correctly because officials would be required to sort the
population and only provide reparations to certain people.299 Another issue with
race-based reparations is the fact that there are millions of poor white people and
people of color who would not be eligible for reparations payments but who
nonetheless could benefit from increased incomes.
Ultimately, the economic and health benefits of a reparations program are
unclear but are likely to be positive from a community healing and restorative justice
standpoint.300 While this program might be politically difficult to pass into law
because of the enduring legacy of racism in the United States, it is nonetheless
worthwhile to pursue as a solution to the racially based income and health disparities
in the United States.
Direct cash payments, either universally distributed or race-based as redress
for past wrongs, could have large benefits for the U.S. economy, especially in the
realm of poverty reduction. Passing such policies into law could be challenging
given the enduring legacy of the bootstraps mythology and racism in the United
States. Yet, the COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated that the United States has
the capacity to efficiently distribute large sums of money to individuals in this
country.301 The federal government’s issuance of unconditional, universal stimulus
checks to Americans in a time of economic hardship has raised new interest in UBI
and reparations policies.302 This response has demonstrated that the United States
has the financial resources303 and logistical capacity to administer such a direct cash
Weller, supra note 289.
Raymond A. Winbush, Reparations for Africans: A Brief Overview of Their History,
COMMUNIQUE (SPECIAL SECTION REPARATIONS: REPAIRING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL HARM?),
January 2005, at iv, vii.
299. See, e.g., David Frum, The Impossibility of Reparations, ATLANTIC ( June 3, 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/06/the-impossibility-of-reparations/372041/
[ https://perma.cc/LH48-2QPF ] (noting potential challenges with administering a reparations
program including identifying eligible recipients, bitterness that could arise between recipients and
others, and the potential that the program’s legitimacy could fade).
300. Winbush, supra note 298.
301. See Kaimipono David Wenger, 1200 Dollars and a Mule: COVID-19, the CARES Act,
and Reparations for Slavery, 68 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 204, 204 (2020).
302. Id. (“[G]overnment responses to the crisis demonstrate the ability to distribute money to
large swaths of Americans. [It is] clearer than ever the moral necessity to provide reparations today.”);
Andrew F. Johnson & Katherine J. Roberto, The COVID‐19 Pandemic: Time for a Universal Basic
Income?, 40 PUB. ADMIN. & DEV. 232, 233 (2014).
303. See, e.g., Elizaveta Fouksman, Why Universal Basic Income Costs Far Less than You Think,
CONVERSATION (Aug. 14, 2018, 7:23 AM), https://theconversation.com/why-universal-basicincome-costs-far-less-than-you-think-101134 [ https://perma.cc/VQV4-NWC4 ] (“[T]o fund a UBI of
US$12,000 per adult and US$6,000 per child every year (while keeping all other spending the same) the
US would have to raise an additional US$539 billion a year – less than 3% of its GDP.”). But see, e.g.,
Dave Canarie, Not Ready for Prime Time: A Response to “Universal Basic Income: Policy Options at
297.
298.
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payment program; now the question is whether leaders will drive public sentiment
toward accepting a policy that substantively helps raise low-income individuals out
of poverty.
CONCLUSION
The United States is in the midst of an economic and public-health
catastrophe. Yet, the COVID-19 pandemic has had vastly different impacts on
Americans based on their race and wealth. Billionaires have grown richer during the
pandemic,304 and millions of people are able to avoid exposure to COVID-19 by
working from home and rearranging their lives to stay out of public.305 On the other
hand, many of the people least equipped to deal with severe illness because of their
limited financial resources and access to health care are exposed to the virus in jobs
referred to as “essential.”306 Though the work they do is considered essential, people
in these positions are treated as expendable: if one cashier gets sick from
COVID-19 exposure, another cashier will be able to fill her place to keep the
business running.307
At the same time, many millions of Americans were laid off during the
pandemic.308 Lower-income Americans were less likely than their middle- and
upper-income counterparts to be reemployed after losing employment since the
COVID-19 pandemic began.309 Many people who lost employment during the
pandemic do not have a safety net to fall back on to ensure that their needs are
National, State, and Local Levels,” 28 ME. POL’Y REV. 76, 76 (2019) (“No matter how one funds
it—whether from general revenues, a tax increase, or a combination of the two—the program still costs
$3.415 trillion.”); Pavlina R. Tcherneva, The High Costs of UBI Are Not Financial: They Are Real, 45
E. ECON. J. 327, 328 (2019) (“[S]pending on UBI could be as high as 20–35% of GDP annually.”).
304. Aimee Picchi, U.S. Billionaires Gained Almost $1 Trillion in Wealth During the Pandemic,
CBS NEWS (Oct. 20, 2020, 1:18 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/billionaires-pandemic-1trillion-wealth-gain/ [ https://perma.cc/5LME-KKW2 ].
305. Elise Gould & Heidi Shierholz, Not Everybody Can Work from Home, ECON. POL’Y
INST. (Mar. 19, 2020, 1:15 PM), https://www.epi.org/blog/black-and-hispanic-workers-are-muchless-likely-to-be-able-to-work-from-home/ [ https://perma.cc/3USU-YWFZ ] (finding that Black and
Latinx workers are less likely to be able to work from home).
306. Henry J. Aaron, The Social Safety Net: The Gaps that COVID-19 Spotlights, BROOKINGS
( June 23, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/06/23/the-social-safety-net-thegaps-that-covid-19-spotlights/ [ https://perma.cc/FZ75-E7KF ].
307. Catherine Powell, The Color and Gender of COVID: Essential Workers, Not Disposable
People, THINK GLOBAL HEALTH ( June 4, 2020), https://www.thinkglobalhealth.org/article/colorand-gender-covid-essential-workers-not-disposable-people [ https://perma.cc/CG3E-WXRX ].
308. Mathieu Despard, Michal Grinstein-Weiss, Yung Chun & Stephen Roll, COVID-19 Job
and Income Loss Leading to More Hunger and Financial Hardship, BROOKINGS ( July 13, 2020), https://
www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/07/13/covid-19-job-and-income-loss-leading-to-morehunger-and-financial-hardship/ [ https://perma.cc/7PV8-AD25 ] (reporting that COVID-19
unemployment rates topped those of the Great Depression at more than 40 million unemployment
benefit claims filed).
309. Kim Parker, Rachel Minkin & Jesse Bennett, Economic Fallout from COVID-19 Continues
to Hit Lower-Income Americans the Hardest, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 24, 2020), https://
www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2020/09/24/economic-fallout-from-covid-19-continues-to-hitlower-income-americans-the-hardest/ [ https://perma.cc/7RVW-JS6V ].
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met.310 This means that people are forced to forgo necessities, dip into retirement
savings, rely on friends and family, and potentially accumulate more debt.311 Black
and Latinx Americans are most likely to experience these financial strains.312
Although the loss from this crisis seems like an anomaly, it merely sheds light
on the chasmic disparities between low-income community members of color and
their wealthier white counterparts.313 One necessary component for pandemic
planning is ensuring a greater economic safety net so that people do not have to
choose between losing income and risking their lives.314 The federal government
has a duty to increase the economic safety net because it created conditions that
have enabled billionaires to massively profit while costing low-income people and
small-business owners their lives and their fortunes.
The new administration has an opportunity to provide bold leadership to
address economic inequality and racial disparities. The new administration should
ignore the false promises of Black-capitalism policy. The evidence is clear that such
policies are a poor use of taxpayer money because they deliver little, if any,
community-development results while costing millions. Further, the new
administration should wind down the OZ program as soon as legally possible and
enact laws that make direct payments to the community members who need it most.
The physical safety and health of all Americans requires the federal government’s
leadership to address the race-based economic disparities that plague this country.

310. Coates, supra note 288 (“Effectively, the black family in America is working without a
safety net. When financial calamity strikes—a medical emergency, divorce, job loss—the fall
is precipitous.”).
311. Parker et al., supra note 309.
312. Id.
313. Wenger, supra note 301, at 204 (“[T]he COVID-19 crisis highlights the medical
vulnerability of the Black community, illustrating the very real physical harm caused by slavery and
racism in the United States.”).
314. Aaron, supra note 306.
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